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Imagine that a homeowner sends a check to her mortgage company every 
month.  Nonetheless, she receives a notice from the mortgage company that it is 
initiating a foreclosure proceeding.  The proceeding does not require a judge, 
jury, or court.  Rather, a designated trustee is the only neutral party who stands 
between the homeowner and an illegal, wrongful foreclosure.  However, there 
is one problem: under current law, the trustee is unregulated and almost always 
financially connected to the same bank that errantly initiated the foreclosure.  
The result is almost always the same: the homeowner loses her home. 
This problem, to which advocates sometimes refer as “housejacking,” is the 
result of the modern foreclosure system’s failure to provide meaningful 
investigation into the mistakes of the foreclosing banks.1  “Housejacking” can 
result if banks mishandle files, lose payments, or even engage in mass perjury 
to produce documents supporting illegal foreclosures. 2   Yet, despite a  
well-documented history of gross negligence and outright fraud, over half of all 
states still allow banks to foreclose on homes without first going to court or 
                                                            
 1. Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, Consumer Attorney, Simon Law Firm (Aug. 15, 
2012) (on file with author). 
 2. See Louis S. Pettey, Ethics in Foreclosure, 26 PROB. & PROP. 47, 47–48 (2012). 
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offering any proof that the foreclosure is valid. 3   In the majority of these  
“non-judicial foreclosures,” a trustee stands in for the judicial system and is 
meant to act as a neutral party to the transaction—with duties to both parties—
to assess the legitimacy of the bank’s claim.4  This dependence on a “neutral” 
trustee is misplaced because trustees present no meaningful safeguard against 
wrongful foreclosure.5 
                                                            
 3. See JOHN RAO & GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. INC., FORECLOSING A 
DREAM, 12 (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/state_laws 
/foreclosing-dream-report.pdf.  Rao and Walsh suggest that thirty states are non-judicial foreclosure 
states.  Id.  However, this depends to some degree on how states are counted and what the common 
practice actually is in the state.  Some states, such as Louisiana, are difficult to count because they 
utilize multiple foreclosure processes that involve the court in varying ways.  Id. at 39. 
 4. See generally id.  This Article rests upon the idea that trustees should be neutral.  The law 
generally recognizes this principle.  See, e.g., McHugh v. Church, 583 P.2d 210, 214 (Alaska 1978) 
(“The trustee under a deed of trust generally is regarded as owing a fiduciary duty to both the trustor 
and the beneficiary and is required to perform his duties impartially.”); Perry v. Va. Mortg. & Inv. 
Co., 412 A.2d 1194, 1197 (D.C. 1980) (quoting S & G Inv. Inc. v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
505 F.2d 370, 377 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1974)) (“In this jurisdiction ‘a trustee under a deed of trust owes 
fiduciary duties both to the noteholder and to the borrower.’”); Lake Hillsdale Estates, Inc. v. 
Galloway, 473 So. 2d 461, 465 (Miss. 1985) (“In a deed of trust the trustee is under a duty to 
perform his duties in good faith and act fairly to protect the rights of all parties equally.”); Smith v. 
Haley, 314 S.W.2d 909, 913 (Mo. 1958) (“The trustee sustains a fiduciary relationship to the debtor 
and the creditor.  Reason and justice exact of him the most scrupulous fidelity in transferring one 
man’s property to another.”); Bonilla v. Roberson, 918 S.W.2d 17, 21 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (“When 
exercising a power contained in a deed of trust, the trustee becomes a special agent for both parties, 
and he must act with absolute impartiality and with fairness to all concerned. . . .”).  Even states 
that do not use the word “neutral” to describe the duty of a trustee impose an approximate version 
of this duty.  See, e.g., Russell v. Lundberg, 120 P.3d 541, 546 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Five 
F, L.L.C. v. Heritage Sav. Bank, 81 P.3d 105, 108 (Utah Ct. App. 2003)) (“While a trustee’s 
primary duty and obligation is to the beneficiary of the trust, ‘the trustee’s duty to the beneficiary 
does not imply that the trustee may ignore the trustor’s rights and interests.’”).  Additionally, a few 
states do not explicitly recognize a duty of neutrality, but still impose statutory requirements on 
trustees for which they can be liable.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-807(E) (2007) 
(explaining that the trustee can be named as a party in legal actions for breaching his obligations 
under the statute).  It is unclear whether this type of statute prohibits a trustee from proceeding with 
a foreclosure sale in the face of evidence that the homeowner was not in default. 
However, this Article does not rest upon a legal analysis of existing trustee law.  Instead, it suggests 
that there is not enough law governing trustees and that the law that does exist is difficult to follow.  
Consequently, improving legislative and litigation methods could alter the role of the trustee. 
 5. Foreclosures occur in two legal regimes: lien theory jurisdictions and title theory 
jurisdictions.  Title theory states typically utilize a deed of trust, which is the document that names 
the trustee who holds bare legal title and, in the event of default, initiates foreclosure, provides 
notice, and carries out the foreclosure sale.  See Elizabeth Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-
Judicial Foreclosure States: The Ibanez Time Bomb?, 4 WM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 111, 131, 140, 
151 (2013).  Additionally, nineteen states and the District of Columbia are both non-judicial and 
require a trustee.  See Security Instruments, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform 
/unifsecurity.html (last visited February 5, 2014) (listing the standard security instruments for each 
state).  Importantly, two of these states rank as the two most populous states in the country: Texas 
and California.  PAUL MACKUN & STEVEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION 
DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010 (2011), available at http://www.census. 
gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf.  This Article is most applicable in those states.  Any state 
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The lack of protection from wrongful foreclosure is especially troubling 
because of what is at stake.  The home is at the center of the American dream 
and is the subject of much of American jurisprudence.  No piece of property is 
treated as more sacred or more worthy of protection from intrusion.  Indeed, in 
many states, homeowners can quite literally shoot someone who enters their 
home unlawfully,6 and in all states, the police must behave differently if they 
wish to search a person’s home.7  How then is it true that over half of the states 
in America allow a bank to take a person’s home in foreclosure without entering 
a courtroom?  And how is it true that the only neutral in such an extrajudicial 
proceeding can also be the attorney for the bank? 
These questions are especially salient in light of the behavior of national banks 
in the last two decades.8  During that time, banks participated in, or, in many 
cases caused, the subprime crisis (the worldwide market collapse due to 
mortgage securitization),9 the creation of shell recording companies to avoid the 
cost of public recording of property ownership,10 robo-signing (an automated 
signature process that is simply perjury in relation to foreclosures), 11 
widespread servicing abuse leading to a $25 billion settlement with the federal 
government,12 and rampant questionable foreclosures, including foreclosures on 
                                                            
that allows a deed of trust at least has the potential for trustees to be involved.  Together, these 
states account for roughly 138 million Americans, or about forty-five percent of the population.  Id. 
 6. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5 (2012).  Many states have enacted “Make My 
Day” immunity laws that provide an affirmative defense to a homeowner who shoots, or uses other 
physical force against, an intruder.  See People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914) 
(misquoting 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 485 (1800)) (“In 
case a man ‘is assailed in his own house, he need not flee as far as he can, as in other cases of se 
defendendo, for he hath the protection of his house to excuse him from flying, as that would be to 
give up the protection of his house to his adversary by flight.’  Flight is for sanctuary and shelter, 
and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the home.”); see also Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: 
Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 530 
(2007) (describing the castle doctrine in Florida). 
 7. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981) (“In terms that apply equally to 
seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the 
entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed 
without a warrant.”). 
 8. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1 (describing questionable bank 
behavior). 
 9. See Renuart, supra note 5, at 118. 
 10. See Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic 
Registration System’s Land Title Theory, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 111, 149 (2011). 
 11. See Pettey, supra note 2 (describing the various actions to which the term  
“robo-signing” refers). 
 12. Jim Puzzanghera & E. Scott Reckard, Banks Report $51 Billion in Consumer Relief in 
Mortgage Settlement, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/2013 
/aug/22/business/la-fi-mo-mortgage-settlement-banks-foreclosure-20130822 (describing Bank of 
America’s, JP Morgan Chase’s, and Wells Fargo’s settlement of state and federal allegations of 
illegal foreclosures). 
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homes that had never been subject to loans.13  These problems demonstrate that 
banks, at least as currently formulated, cannot police themselves.  However, 
despite growing concerns, banks have initiated in excess of ten million 
foreclosures since 2008.14 
In the majority of states, trustees stand between banks and the homeowner.15  
Because of their vital role, courts watch the “proceedings [of trustees] with a 
jealous and scrutinizing eye,”16 and require that the trustee provide “the most 
scrupulous fidelity.” 17   However, in reality trustees are almost never held 
accountable for failing to fulfill their duties.18  Trustees are routinely untrained, 
unregulated, and many times closely tied to the banks that initiate foreclosures.19  
In the best cases, trustees are unprepared to handle the complex questions that 
securitization has created.  In the worst, trustees have a financial incentive to 
authorize foreclosures as quickly as possible, regardless of what evidence of 
fraud or negligence may be available.20  Moreover, the lack of regulation of 
                                                            
 13. See Harriet Johnson Brackey, Lauderdale Man’s Home Sold Out from Under Him in 
Foreclosure Mistake, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.) (Sept. 23, 2010), http://articles.sun 
-sentinel.com/2010-09-23/business/fl-wrongful-foreclosure-0922-20100921_1_foreclosure 
-defense-attorney-foreclosure-case-jumana-bauwens; Joshua Rhett Miller, Bank of America to Pay 
Florida Couple in Mistaken Foreclosure Case, FOX NEWS (June 6, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/06/06/bank-america-pays-florida-couple-in-mistaken 
-foreclosure-case. 
 14. See Press Release, RealtyTrac, Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure 
Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low in December, (Jan. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/record-29-million-us-properties-receive 
-foreclosure-filings-in-2010-despite-30-month-low-in-december-6309 (reporting the number of 
foreclosures and increase in the foreclosure rate since 2006). 
 15. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Homeownership—Dream or Disaster?, 21 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING 17, 33 (2012). 
 16. West v. Axtell, 17 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Mo. 1929). 
 17. Edwards v. Smith, 322 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1959). 
 18. Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 19. Erich Vieth, Mortgage Crisis in a Nutshell—Presented by John Campbell, YOUTUBE 
(Apr. 21, 2012), at 26:06, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YBbwb6Sv4PM (laying out the root 
causes of the modern mortgage crisis and providing an in-depth understanding of fundamental 
changes in the mortgage industry that make the role of the trustee even more vital).  Many states 
do not even impose minimum requirements regulating who can be named a trustee.  Telephone 
Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 20. In many cases, the trustee is also the attorney for the bank.  See, e.g., In re Vogler Realty, 
Inc., 722 S.E.2d 459, 460–61 (N.C. 2012); Interview with Bruce Neas, Legislative Coordinator, 
Columbia Legal Servs. (July 24, 2012) (on file with author) (explaining that, although the attorneys 
for the banks are not usually the trustees in Washington, the relationship is still very close).  
Additionally, the law firms that represent foreclosing banks often have ownership interests in 
trustee companies.  See, e.g., Company Profile, NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVS., INC., 
http://www.northwesttrustee.com/profile.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2013) (describing Northwest 
Trustee Corporation, which is owned, in part, by the law firm that represents most of the foreclosing 
banks in Washington). 
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trustees and their financial ties to the foreclosing banks combine to cause even 
more serious problems.21 
These problems are unique to our times.  Although the role of trustees has 
always been critical, it was not always complicated.  In a typical lending 
situation, it was evident who owed what to whom, and the fundamental elements 
required for a legal foreclosure—that default occurred and that the party 
foreclosing had standing to foreclose—were not in question. 22   Modern 
foreclosures are drastically different.  The mortgage crisis has revealed an 
alarming number of questionable foreclosures.23  Indeed, it is often unclear who 
owns the note,24 who is secured, what is owed, and whether it was paid.25 
One may wonder why these problems are not being discussed more often, why 
courts are not carefully scrutinizing the work of trustees, and why legislators are 
not responding to these problems.  There are several reasons why the problem 
has gone largely unexplored.  First, homeowners are vulnerable at the time of 
foreclosure, often lacking the time, money, or energy to wage a fight.26  Second, 
there are very attorneys who represent homeowners in such matters and there is 
a lack of oversight because no court is directly involved.27  Third, the problem 
is new and complex, so a relatively small number of have pierced the veil of the 
modern mortgage era sufficiently to detail it and identify problems.  Finally, 
characterizing trustees as unregulated and often outright unfair actors is an 
assertion that attorneys are engaged in wrongdoing.  This is unpopular because 
many attorneys believe it is uncouth to sue or otherwise criticize other attorneys. 
The result of the confluence of the modern mortgage era with ineffectual 
trustees is that the fox is in charge of the chicken coop.  Banks that have had 
their credibility called into question are directing foreclosures with little to no 
supervision.28  To say that this is producing tragic results for homeowners is to 
understate the problem.  In many cases, there is no certainty that the homeowner 
failed to pay nor is there certainty that the party who is foreclosing is the party 
with the legal right to do so.  In the more egregious cases, in which there is solid 
                                                            
 21. An independent search revealed that, with the exception of public trustees in Colorado, 
trustees are not truly free of ties to the banks.  Consequently, although not every trustee seeks to be 
unfair, the lack of training and regulation, coupled with the gravitational pull of the banks that pay 
the trustees, indicates that the lack of regulation and the potential for bias work in concert and must 
be discussed together. 
 22. Vieth, supra note 19, at 35:30.  See generally Renuart, supra note 5, at 436 (providing an 
overview of the foreclosure process). 
 23. See Aletra P. Williams, Foreclosing Foreclosure: Escaping the Yawning Abyss of the 
Deep Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 455, 457 & n.8 (2012). 
 24. See Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title Recording 
System, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 19, 19–20 (2011). 
 25. See Williams, supra note 23, at 467. 
 26. See id. at 468. 
 27. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 28. Brackey, supra note 13. 
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proof that the homeowner was current on his payments but his house was taken 
regardless, the circumstances are even more troubling.29 
This Article is a response both to the need for exposition of the problem and 
for constructive suggested solutions.  It is meant to be a marriage of storytelling 
(about the real people who are suffering harm), investigative journalism 
regarding the role of trustees (because it draws from interviews with 
practitioners to reveal facts that do not appear in books or articles), diagnosis 
and analysis of the fundamental problems with the current trustee structure, and 
proposal of meaningful and realistic reform.30 
Part I of this Article provides background of the current foreclosure problem 
by recounting the story of a specific homeowner and tracking media reports and 
scholarly literature that chronicle the wave of wrongful foreclosures sweeping 
the country.  Part II considers how the modern mortgage era differs from how 
the process operated in the past.  Part III discusses how the current non-judicial 
foreclosure regime works and the role of the trustee in this process.  It also 
identifies a number of specific problems that relate to the role, or non-role, of 
trustees.  Finally, Part IV proposes reforming the role of trustees through a 
combination of strategic legislation, litigation, and ethical inquiries and 
complaints. 
I.  THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
Homeownership increased throughout the twentieth century, and, by 2000, 
over two-thirds of Americans owned their homes.31   As home values rose, 
homeowners took out larger loans to purchase larger houses.32  However, when 
home values suddenly dropped, these loans far exceeded the value of the 
                                                            
 29. See, e.g., id. 
 30. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address every question and present every solution 
to what is a multifaceted, institutional failure.  There is undoubtedly a need for true reform of home 
lending, the securitization process, and public and internal recordkeeping.  There are also multiple 
solutions to the wrongful foreclosure problem that could be implemented, including mediation 
programs utilized by several states.  See generally Geoff Walsh, The Finger in the Dike: State and 
Local Laws Combat the Foreclosure Tide, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 139, 158–59 (2011) (discussing 
legislation Massachusetts, New York, Washington, Nevada and Illinois passed to curb wrongful 
foreclosure and foreclosures in general); see also Williams, supra note 23, at 458  (summarizing a 
variety of responses by state legislatures to the foreclosure crisis).  Another interesting solution 
proposes a unified electronic recording system and the merger of the note and mortgage into one 
viewable document.  Alan M. White, Losing the Paper—Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers 
and Consumer Protection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 498 (2012).  Finally, the proposed 
Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act (UNFA) contains some novel suggestions for addressing the 
hodgepodge of divergent state substantive and procedural rules relating to foreclosure.  Grant S. 
Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 
53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1401 (2004). 
 31. See Salsich, supra note 15, at 25. 
 32. See id. at 28. 
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homes.33   At the same time, the rates on many of the loans increased and 
consumed more of the homeowners’ income.34  As a result, homeowners began 
to default on loans, and, because their loans were “underwater,” they could not 
refinance.35 
The consequences were staggering.  In early 2007, 2.23% of homeowners 
were seriously delinquent on their mortgages, resulting in approximately 
980,000 overdue loans.36  By the end of 2009, the percentage of delinquent 
mortgages rose to 9.67%, representing 4.3 million overdue loans.37  By the end 
of the second quarter of 2012, the rate was still 7.58%.38 
These delinquencies led to a devastating number of foreclosures.  In 2008, 
were 2.3 million properties were in foreclosure.39  In 2009, as the mortgage crisis 
continued to build, an estimated 2.9 million properties were in foreclosure.40  In 
2010, the number was roughly the same.41  In 2011, approximately 2.7 million 
homes were in foreclosure.42   In 2012, roughly 1.8 million homes were in 
foreclosure.43  Although there may be some overlap in the properties that were 
in foreclosure from year to year, the number of completed foreclosures is equally 
shocking.  Over 3.4 million families have actually been foreclosed upon and 
displaced.44 
                                                            
 33. See id.  The rate at which home values dropped when the housing bubble burst in 2008 
was faster than the rate at which home prices dropped during the Great Depression.  Id. at 24. 
 34. Vieth, supra note 19, at 8:45. 
 35. See Salsich, supra note 15, at 20 (defining an underwater loan as a loan obligation that is 
higher in value than the property for which the loan was issued). 
 36. Renuart, supra note 5, at 117 & n.6 (citing MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL 
DELINQUENCY SURVEY Q1 (2007)) (defining “seriously delinquent” mortgage loans as those that 
are “ninety days or more delinquent or in foreclosure”). 
 37. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY Q4 2 (2009), available at 
http://media.oregonlive.com/frontporch/other/NDS_Q409.pdf. 
 38. Press Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, Mortgage Delinquencies Increase in Latest MBA 
Survey, MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION (Aug. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/81589.htm. 
 39. See Press Release, RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 Percent in 2008 (Jan. 
15, 2009), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/foreclosure-activity 
-increases-81-percent-in-2008-4551. 
 40. See Press Release, RealtyTrac, supra note 14. 
 41. See id. (reporting that between 2009 and 2010 the number of properties in foreclosure 
increased by two percent). 
 42. See Press Release, RealtyTrac, 2011 Year-End Foreclosure Report: Foreclosures on the 
Retreat (Jan. 9, 2012), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market 
-report/2011-year-end-foreclosure-market-report-6984. 
 43. See Press Release, RealtyTrac, 1.8 Million U.S. Properties with Foreclosure Filings in 
2012 (Jan. 14, 2013), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/Content/foreclosure-market 
-report/2012-year-end-foreclosure-market-report-7547. 
 44. See Chris Guldi, 3.4 Million Completed Foreclosures Since Sept. 2008, CoreLogic 
Reports, GULDI GROUP (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.guldigroup.com/2012/04/3-4-million 
-completed-foreclosures-since-sept-2008-corelogic-reports/ (discussing a CoreLogic report that 
measured data from 2008 to April of 2012). 
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The loss of these homes not only affected families, but it also had an impact 
on the global community.  For example, foreclosures damage the property value 
of nearby properties, resulting in over $1.86 trillion in lost property value during 
the recovery years.45  Foreclosures also affect credit scores and can lead to 
bankruptcy.46  As a result, homeownership is becoming increasingly difficult,47 
and communities are struggling to recover from the burst of the housing 
bubble.48  Alarmingly, the data suggests that millions of additional foreclosures 
are still to come.49 
The risky loans and predatory terms that lead to foreclosure in many cases 
also apply for the life of the loan. Although some of these terms are being 
modified, modification has proven to be a far from perfect fix.50  Additionally, 
the underlying challenges that securitization presents to identifying who can 
foreclose and who is in default will persist indefinitely, as questionable practices 
continue to be legal and commonplace.  A solution that would curb wrongful 
foreclosures is needed immediately and will have long-term future benefits. 
A.  Wrongful Foreclosures Abound 
It is important to note at the outset that media reports and scholarly work 
address both judicial and non-judicial foreclosures because the same errors 
relating to record keeping, standing, and outright fraud exist in both settings.  
The only notable difference is that in judicial foreclosure states, the court has at 
least some opportunity to examine the validity of foreclosures.51  Given the 
massive number of foreclosures, the involvement of a neutral party is far from a 
complete solution.  However, there is reason to believe that the involvement of 
a neutral makes a difference.  For example, in Florida, fraudulent,  
robo-signed documents caused a number of egregious foreclosures.52  After a 
Florida court discovered the problem during foreclosure litigation, the state 
promulgated new rules that required attorneys to verify the authenticity of 
documents supporting foreclosure.53  It follows that, if wrongful foreclosures 
can occur under a court’s watchful eye, the problems in states without a 
                                                            
 45. Alexander Bader, Note, Truly Protecting the Consumer in Light of the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis: How Generally Applicable State Consumer Protection Laws Must be a Key Tool 
in Keeping Lending Institutions Honest, 25 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 767, 768 (2011). 
 46. See Williams, supra note 23, at 470–71 (noting the correlation between foreclosure filings 
and bankruptcy filings). 
 47. See Salsich, supra note 15, at 23. 
 48. See Renuart, supra note 5, at 117. 
 49. See Williams, supra note 23, at 456. 
 50. Approximately 5.7 million loans have been modified since 2007.  HOPE NOW, SUPPORT 
AND GUIDELINES FOR HOMEOWNERS (2012), available at http://www.hopenow.com/pdf 
/HN%20Brochure%20Final_spreads.pdf. 
 51. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 52. Brackey, supra note 13. 
 53. Cf. Vieth, supra note 1 (discussing the impact of the Bank of America foreclosure crisis 
in Florida). 
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meaningful neutral party must exist, and they are likely to be worse.  
Additionally, interjecting a meaningful neutral into non-judicial foreclosure will 
not stop all wrongful foreclosures, but it help to reduce their frequency. 
B.  Real-Life Example: Ron Meehow Loses His Home Despite Making All of 
His Mortgage Payments 
Ron Meehow obtained a refinanced loan from LoanQuest, a subprime lender 
that subsequently went out of business.54  Within months, Ron received notice 
to begin making payments to National Bank and Trust, the servicer of the loan.  
Even though Ron was unsure of why he should pay a third party, he continued 
to make the payments because he did not want to lose his home.  Ron made 
timely payments for six years. 
Around seven years after the original loan, Ron received a notice from 
American Bank, which informed him that he was behind on his payments.  
Although unsure of how American was connected to his loan, Ron called the 
bank.  He informed the representative that he had electronic confirmation of 
every single payment.  The representative could not explain the mistake, but 
suggested that the bank would rectify problem.  A few days later, Ron received 
a promotional packet in the mail offering to refinance his loan to reduce his 
monthly payments.  Ron had not requested a modification, but the deal sounded 
fair.  Ron immediately signed the paperwork and returned it to American at the 
address provided in the packet.  About a week later, he received a signed copy 
of the modification.  Thereafter, he began making payments at the modified rate.  
Ron and his wife stopped worrying about the notice of default and felt secure 
with a signed contract from American and a lower monthly payment. 
However, three months later, Ron received a letter from the law firm of Huck 
& Fole attempting to collect a debt on behalf of American and claiming that Ron 
was in default on his home loan and at risk of foreclosure.   Ron was both furious 
and afraid.  Ron called American and spoke to two customer service 
representatives and the foreclosure department, but no one could help him.  
Frustrated after two hours of calls, he hung up.  He called again several days in 
a row, but no one could explain what was happening, and some representatives 
even suggested it was a clerical error that would be resolved soon. 
Huck then sent Ron another letter, informing him that Huck was the successor 
trustee, and that his house would be sold in foreclosure in three weeks.  After 
searching the internet, Ron learned that a trustee was a neutral party who carried 
                                                            
 54. Although the names are fictitious, the following example is based on a case that was 
litigated in St. Charles County, Missouri.  See First Amended Petition, Rippy v. Chase Bank, No. 
1111-CV0667 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 2011) (providing the factual basis of Rippy v. Chase Bank, on 
which Ron Meehow’s story is based).  This case is only one of countless others throughout the 
country that allege that a bank foreclosed in the absence of default or in direct conflict to the 
promises it made to modify a loan.  These same allegations, along with many others, gave rise to 
the $25 billion settlement between five of the largest national loan servicers and the United States.  
See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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out a foreclosure after a homeowner defaulted on his loan.  Ron wondered how 
Huck could represent American and be the neutral party at the same time. 
Ron hired an attorney and he provided him with all relevant documentation of 
his loan and the payments he had made.  The attorney did not specialize in 
mortgage law, but believed the case should not be too difficult because the 
situation appeared to be a clear mistake.  The attorney knew that a foreclosure 
could not occur if the homeowner made the requisite payments.  He called an 
attorney at Huck and offered to send proof of the signed modification and Ron’s 
payments.  However, the lawyer at Huck told him that the firm did exactly what 
American told it to do.  Ron’s attorney was shocked and explained that Huck 
was required to be neutral party and had a fiduciary duty to Ron under state law.  
The attorney at Huck only reiterated that he could not stop a foreclosure without 
American’s permission. 
The attorney at Huck told Ron’s attorney that he needed to contact American 
directly.  Ron’s attorney called American and sent a letter.  American suggested 
that the modification simply needed to be sent to its “Fulfillment Center,” after 
which American would cancel the foreclosure.  However, Ron soon received 
notice that foreclosure would proceed.  Ron and his attorney made more calls, 
and were successful in postponing the foreclosure.  However, American soon set 
a new date, and the foreclosure continued, with Huck’s assistance throughout 
the proceedings.  Despite Ron’s and his attorney’s efforts, the foreclosure took 
place and Ron lost his home.  Ron never had a chance to be heard in court 
because American was not required to use judicial process to complete the 
foreclosure, and he could not afford to pay his attorney to file a lawsuit. 
In addition to losing his home, Ron was legally responsible for the difference 
between the price of the house at the foreclosure sale and the amount he owed 
on the loan. This “deficiency” had the potential to bankrupt Ron.  In an effort to 
reduce the deficiency, state law required the trustee (Huck) to sell Ron’s home 
for the highest possible price.  However, despite the fact that there was a paper 
in Ron’s town with a circulation of over 500,000 people, Huck only published 
notice of the sale in a paper with less than one thousand readers and that was 
only targeted to lawyers.  Huck sold the house to the only bidder, Government 
Mortgage Corporation (Govie Mo), and Huck’s long-time client.  Govie Mo 
purchased the house for $120,000, which was about $30,000 less than the 
amount Ron owed on the house. 
Five days after the sale, Huck posted a notice on Ron’s door notifying him 
that he was living in the house illegally and that he must move out or Huck would 
involve the sheriff.  Ron told his wife and son they had to move.  Ron’s wife 
worried about how the foreclosure would affect their credit score, and how they 
would afford a new home.  They had spent what little extra money they had on 
the attorney.  Ron’s son worried about whether he would need to leave his school 
and his friends.  Despite Huck’s notice, Ron’s family could not move out 
immediately because they had nowhere else to go. 
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A few days later, the sheriff’s office sent notice that, because Ron and his 
family had not yet left, they were unlawfully detaining the house.  Additionally, 
Govie Mo was suing Ron for $1,000 per month in rent, plus additional fines to 
punish Ron for illegally living the house.  Ron noticed that Huck, the trustee 
from his foreclosure proceeding, was also representing Govie Mo. 
The court ordered Ron’s family to vacate their home, on which they continued 
to make payments.  A month later, the court ordered Ron to pay $4,800 in back 
rent.  The foreclosure also promptly appeared on Ron’s credit report.  Less than 
two weeks later, the sheriff forced Ron and his family to leave the house.  Ron 
was forced to move his family to a small apartment in a bad part of town.  They 
had to dispose of some of their belongings because they could not fit in the new 
apartment.  Ron’s son had to change schools.  Ron’s wife was embarrassed by 
their situation.  Ron was depressed.  Their entire lives had changed.  Eventually, 
Govie Mo notified Ron that it would begin to garnish his wages.  All he could 
do was despair. 
C.  Ron’s Story Is Not Unique: Reports of Wrongful Foreclosures Are 
Widespread 
As the number of home foreclosures rises, so does the potential for wrongful 
foreclosures. 55   A few have garnered media attention, but many more go 
unnoticed.  One of the most shocking foreclosures to receive press coverage 
involved a Florida man who discovered that Bank of America had foreclosed his 
home, despite the fact that he had never taken out a loan from that bank.56  The 
homeowner learned of the foreclosure only after it was complete and title had 
been transferred to a government-backed agency.57  The homeowner filed a 
lawsuit and ultimately got his home back.58  The case is especially troubling 
because Florida is a judicial foreclosure state, which requires Bank of America 
to file documents supporting its right to foreclosure.59  Bank of America could 
only have produced the documents through robo-signing.60 
In another Florida case, a couple purchased a home in full and consequently 
presumed they would have no further interaction with the bank.61  However, a 
year after the purchase, Bank of America notified the couple that their home was 
under foreclosure. 62   Although Bank of America acknowledged that the 
foreclosure was a mistake after the couple filed a lawsuit, the battle continued 
                                                            
 55. See Elizabeth Renuart, Toward A More Equitable Balance: Homeowner and Purchaser 
Tensions in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 562, 562–63 (2012). 
 56. Brackey, supra note 13 (noting that the homeowner purchased the home with cash). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1 (discussing the Bank of America 
foreclosure crisis). 
 59. See generally id. (providing an overview of Florida’s foreclosure process). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Miller, supra note 13. 
 62. See id. 
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because Bank of America was reluctant to pay the couple’s attorney’s fees.63  
The Bank paid the fees only after the couple’s ambitious attorney secured a lien, 
went to a Bank of America branch with a police officer to enforce the lien, and 
threatened to seize the branch’s physical assets.64 
Scholars have noted similar problems.  For example, Professor Katy Porter 
discusses the consequences of abusive mortgage servicing, highlighting cases in 
which the servicing was incorrect or inaccurate. 65   Porter explains that, in 
Rawlings v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., the servicer repeatedly asserted that 
the homeowners had failed to make payments even though the servicer itself had 
erred by applying the payments to the wrong account. After the servicer sent 
notices of default and imposed late fees, the homeowners spent over seven 
months attempting to resolve the servicer’s error.  In another instance, Islam v. 
Option One Mortgage Corp., the borrowers refinanced, but the prior servicer 
continued to threaten to foreclose on the borrowers’ home and to report adverse 
information to credit bureaus.66 
Similarly, according to the Boston Globe, “mortgage companies typically 
include projected foreclosure costs in payoff amounts given to borrowers in 
default,” even if the costs are never actually incurred.67  According to a member 
of the industry, this practice is “‘pretty much industry standard.’”68 
Porter’s reports are consistent with other studies of and reports on the 
mortgage crisis, 69  including the actions of the Federal government.  For 
example, on January 7, 2013, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) 
reported that ten servicing companies—the companies that collect payments on 
mortgages—agreed to pay $8.5 billion in compensation for servicing errors to 
over 3.8 million borrowers. 70   Before this agreement, a previous OCC 
                                                            
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See generally Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage 
Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2008). 
 66. Id. at 131–32 (discussing Rawlings v. Dovenmuehle Mortg., Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1156 
(M.D. Ala. 1999), and Islam v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 432 F. Supp. 2d 181 (D. Mass. 2006)). 
 67. Id. (citing Sacha Pfeiffer, Hidden Legal Fees Push Some Into Foreclosure, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 18, 2007, at D1). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 23, at 467 (“Irrespective of whether a jurisdiction is a 
judicial or non-judicial foreclosure system, the foreclosure process seems to be riddled with 
systemic flaws.  Common foreclosure errors include: a) a mortgage servicer’s inadvertent 
misapplication of a debtor’s mortgage payments; b) failure to recognize a debtor’s exemption from 
foreclosure under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act; c) failure to prove a foreclosing party’s 
title to a promissory note; d) improper endorsements of mortgage notes; e) backdating paperwork 
or assignments; f) affidavits without signatures filed or personal knowledge of its contents; g) 
claiming inflated legal fees associated with foreclosure; or h) lost or missing promissory notes.”). 
 70. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & Office of the Comptroller 
of Currency, Independent Foreclosure Review to Provide $3.3 Billion in Payments, $5.2 Billion in 
Mortgage Assistance (Jan. 7, 2013), available at http://www.occ.gov/news 
-issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-ia-2013-3.html. 
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initiative—the Independent Foreclosure Review—required servicers like Bank 
of America, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, U.S. Bank, and Wells Fargo to pay to 
audit every individual foreclosure they initiated.71  OCC’s imposition of broader 
enforcement is evidence that there are other potential problems with foreclosures 
in all states, even those that use trustees. 
Interviews with attorneys, reviews of press reports and the scholarly literature, 
and the author’s personal experiences as a practicing consumer attorney are 
consistent with the documented cases and reach the same conclusion: wrongful 
foreclosures happen every day. 
II.  THE MODERN MORTGAGE ERA AND NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE 
The mortgage industry has become immensely complex.  There are vast 
differences between the way the industry operated for close to two hundred years 
and the current system. 72   Understanding the differences is essential to 
understanding why the current non-judicial foreclosure model, with its use of 
unregulated and untrained trustees, is ineffective.  Specifically, the mortgage 
industry has transformed from a transparent system with only a few moving parts 
to an immensely complicated system with more actors, documents, transfers of 
notes, and questions about recordkeeping, resulting in far less certainty and 
transparency.73  This increasing uncertainty underscores the need for trustees to 
be trained, careful, and, most importantly, fair. 
A.  The Previous Lending Scheme 
Thirty years ago, almost every home loan originated from a local bank and 
was made to a local borrower.74  The bank issued a loan only if it believed the 
borrower could repay the loan, the house was worth more than the loan, and 
terms were favorable enough to allow the bank to earn a profit over the life of 
                                                            
 71. Id. 
 72. See, e.g., Marsh, supra note 24, at 20–21 (describing the differences in title recording in 
recent years). 
 73. For an interesting way to conceptualize the changes in the mortgage field, see generally 
James Charles Smith, The Structural Causes of Mortgage Fraud, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 473, 480 
(2010) (suggesting that there is geographic distance, transaction distance, and financial distance in 
the new home lending model).  Today, companies making loans are farther away, which limits 
appraisals and underwriting to paper reviews and makes it far more likely that the lender does not 
understand property values or recognize fraudulently high appraisals.  See id. at 480–88 (discussing 
geographic distance).  Additionally, one party brokers the loans, while another party makes the 
loans, and a third party holds the loans.  See id. at 488–94 (discussing transactional distance).  This 
reduces the incentive and ability of the original lender to ensure performance of the loan.  See id.  
Finally, the holders of the loans have less incentive to research and resolve potential payment 
problems because they own a fraction of the interests in loans (due to tranches from securitization) 
than they did when they held an interest in the entire note.  See id. at 494–98 (discussing financial 
distance).  These three “distances” lead to more fraud, more negligence, fewer work-outs, and more 
foreclosures. Id. at 476–77. 
 74. Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
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the loan.75  If the debtor defaulted, the bank’s only recourse was to foreclose, 
which was not an especially profitable outcome.76  If it foreclosed, the bank 
could not collect thirty years of interest, inevitably incurred foreclosure costs,77 
and became responsible for the property until it sold again.78  Consequently, 
banks independently investigated the ability of the borrower to repay by 
checking his credit and references or analyzing his debt to income ratio.79  The 
bank also appraised the home to ascertain its real value.80  Additionally, banks 
typically required a ten percent down payment to ensure that the value of the 
loan was less than the value of the house.81  Finally, the bank would contract for 
a reasonable interest rate to set payments that the borrower could hopefully make 
for the next thirty years.82 
The transaction was also simple.  The borrower gave the bank security in the 
house in return for the loan.83  He knew exactly who to pay and exactly what 
would happen if he failed to make his payments.  If the borrower missed a 
payment, the bank would call him.84  If the bank was mistaken, the borrower 
could prove the error by providing proof of payment.85  Therefore, the borrower 
had an incentive to inform the bank if he experienced problems or a disruption 
in income, and the bank had an interest in working with the borrower to avoid 
foreclosure and ensure that the borrower continued to make payments.86  The 
bank also made a clear record of its security interest with the recorder of deeds 
office, which was public and readily accessible to interested parties.87 
Under this system, the interests of the borrower and the bank were largely 
aligned.  The bank had no interest in making a loan that a borrower could not 
                                                            
 75. Vieth, supra note 19, at 46:30. 
 76. Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 77. Sally Pittman, Comment, Arms, But No Legs to Stand On: “Subprime” Solutions Plague 
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 40 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1089, 1100 (2008) (noting that banks report 
that the average cost of a home foreclosure is $60,000). 
 78. Cf. Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1 (indicating that banks were far 
more involved with the loan and foreclosure process in the past). 
 79. Vieth, supra note 19, at 49:40; see also Juliet M. Moringiello, Mortgage Modification, 
Equitable Subordination, and the Honest but Unfortunate Creditor, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 
1601 (2011) (explaining that, in the past, banks “required full documentation of the borrower’s 
income”); Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1 (noting that “banks recorded 
everything” in reference to the loans they issued). 
 80. See Vieth, supra note 19, at 45:30 (explaining that, in some small communities, a bank 
employee would personally walk through the home to assess the value of the property). 
 81. See id. at 46:10. 
 82. See id. at 46:20. 
 83. See id. at 46:40; see also Renuart, supra note 55, at 565 (explaining that a mortgage loan 
“consists of two distinct documents, a note and a security agreement”). 
 84. Vieth, supra note 19, at 47:45. 
 85. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 86. See Vieth, supra note 19, at 48:00; see also Pittman, supra note 77, at 1099. 
 87. See Vieth, supra note 19, at 48:25. 
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afford, overstating the value of the home, or having someone else collect the 
money on the loan.88 
The trustee’s role in this setting was often simple and did not create a conflict 
between the bank and the homeowner.  The bank would notify the trustee of the 
default, and the trustee gained only a nominal fee for overseeing the foreclosure 
and typically had a separate and unrelated full-time job.89  If the homeowner was 
actually in default, the sale proceeded.90  However, if the homeowner was not in 
default, neither the trustee nor the bank was inclined to proceed with the 
foreclosure, especially if the borrower could resume payments.91 
If a sale did occur, it was in both the bank’s and the borrower’s interests to 
sell the house for the highest possible price.92  A higher sale price allowed the 
bank to recover the loan debt and the borrower to avoid potential deficiency.93  
The trustee owed a duty to both parties, but because there was no real conflict 
between the interests of the bank and the borrower, the trustee could easily fulfill 
its duties.94 
B.  The Modern Mortgage Era 
The modern mortgage era bears almost no resemblance to the previous 
lending scheme.  Instead, subprime lending, mass securitization,  
non-transparent recording of transfers and the fractionalization of 
responsibilities for loan servicing and foreclosure have fundamentally altered 
how and when foreclosure occurs and what is required to ensure those 
foreclosures are appropriate. 
1.  The Rise of Subprime Lenders 
The mortgage industry began to change dramatically in the late 1990s, and, 
by the early 2000s, the changes were everywhere.95  Traditional banks were no 
longer the only banks that made loans; non-traditional lenders—companies such 
                                                            
 88. Id. at 48:30; Roy D. Oppenheim and Jacquelyn K. Trask-Rahn, Deconstructing the Black 
Magic of Securitized Trusts: How the Mortgage-backed Securitization Process is Hurting the 
Banking Industry’s Ability to Foreclose and Proving the Best Offense for a Foreclosure Defense, 
41 STETSON L. REV. 745, 751 (2012). Many local, community banks still operate in this manner.  
Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1.  The first home loan the author ever received 
was in 2002, and the process worked exactly as described above. 
 89. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Vieth, supra note 19, at 4:26. 
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as Ameriquest and Countrywide—soon became some of the largest lenders in 
the country.96  These lenders made loans in large part to “subprime” borrowers.97 
New lenders, many of which had minimal lending experience, issued loans by 
the hundreds of thousands.98  Mortgage brokers often cold called borrowers to 
entice them to buy a house or refinance a pre-existing loan, and they continually 
reached out to these borrowers to encourage additional refinancing.99  These 
mortgage brokers received commissions and kickbacks based on the size of the 
loan and if they could encourage customers to take out loans with higher interest 
rates than those for which the customer qualified.100 
Additionally, lenders were no longer local.  Rather, the typical lender became 
a national organization that was often headquartered in California or Illinois.101  
Non-local lenders appraised properties through “desk appraisals,”102 by which 
the lender searched for comparable sales in the same neighborhood and used the 
basic information of other homes, such as the age, condition, and size of the 
home, to complete the application.103  Similarly, the process of underwriting was 
reduced to accepting lower credit scores and reliance upon “no doc”104 or “liar’s 
loans,”105 which no longer required proof of income.106  Even if the loan did 
require proof of income, the agent would still extend the loan to borrowers 
whose income did not meet the lender’s standards by simply listing a “home 
business” or other source of income to inflate the numbers.107  The borrower 
often didn’t see the final numbers until the time of closing.  Loans were often 
closed at restaurants or in people’s homes because the loan companies were 
rarely local.108  In many cases, a notary with no knowledge of the documents 
brought the loan materials to the lender and executed the loan.109  Loans closed 
                                                            
 96. See id. at 4:30. 
 97. See id. at 5:07; see also Pittman supra note 77, at 1092 (explaining that subprime loans 
were created for individuals with low income or poor credit). 
 98. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 99. See Baher Azmy & David Reiss, Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending: The New 
Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of 2002, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 645, 656, 660 (2004); see also 
HENDRICK SMITH, WHO STOLE THE AMERICAN DREAM? 200–01 (2012) (noting that the goal of 
loan flipping is to “lock the borrower into [an] abusive loan”). 
 100. See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 99, at 653. 
 101. Smith, supra note 73, at 485–86. 
 102. See Vieth, supra note 19, at 50:15. 
 103. See id. at 7:35. 
 104. See Bader, supra note 45, at 773. 
 105. SMITH, supra note 99, at 206–07.  Other types of exotic loans included the NINJA, a loan 
that required no assets, no income, and no job.  Id. at 201–02; see also Vieth, supra note 19, at 6:40. 
 106. See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 99, at 657. 
 107. See id. at 657; see also SMITH, supra note 99, at 207–09 (chronicling the total absence of 
quality control for loans). 
 108. See Vieth, supra note 19, at 9:20. 
 109. See id. 
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quickly and typically consisted of dozens or even hundreds of pages.110  This led 
to seriously flawed loans that were destined to result in foreclosure. 
The loans themselves were also different.  Instead of fixed rates, or even 
adjustable rates that varied up or down with market forces, these new loans were 
“exotic mortgages,” with adjustable rates that could increase, but could never 
fall below the original starting level.111  Many of these loans were exploding 
adjustable rate mortgages (exploding ARMs), which carried rates that were 
scheduled to adjust in two or three years.112  Other loans artificially lowered the 
borrower’s payments for the first two years, only requiring him to pay the 
interest and fixing the amount of the principal for the two-year period. 113  
Lenders also utilized negative amortization loans, under which the borrower 
made payments for two or three years, but at the end of that time still owed more 
than when they started.114  These loans had one thing in common: the payments 
could increase dramatically in only a few years.115  Even if a borrower could 
afford the first two years of payments, there was no guarantee that he could 
afford the new payments when the adjustment occurred.116  As mortgage broker 
Kathryn Keller explained, “‘[t]he banks are playing to brokers who specialize in 
driving people into loans that people don’t understand. . . .  They take a product 
that was exotic and move it to the category of a weapon—seriously.  These loans 
go from being an exotic product to a hand grenade.’”117  As the loans explode, 
the foreclosure crisis grows, the casualties mount, and the need for neutral 
trustees deepens. 
2.  The Rise of Mass Loan Securitization 
As the mortgage process changed, non-traditional lenders were less motivated 
to ensure that borrowers would actually make payments for the full thirty 
                                                            
 110. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 111. See Vieth, supra note 19, at 8:45. 
 112. SMITH, supra note 99, at 202–04 (explaining that these are often called 2/28 ARMs); see 
also Pittman, supra note 77, at 1090 (describing the practical consequences of exploding ARMs); 
Vieth, supra note 19, at 8:55. 
 113. See Pittman, supra note 77, at 1096. 
 114. Azmy & Reiss, supra note 99, at 662. 
 115. Pittman, supra note 77, at 1095–96 (“[P]redatory loans typically have at least one of the 
following characteristics: (1) they charge higher interest and fees than required to cover the added 
risk of lending to borrowers with credit problems[,] (2) they contain abusive terms and conditions 
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 116. See Peter W. Salsich, National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Legislation: The Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis Also Hits Renters, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 11, 32 (2009). 
 117. SMITH, supra note 99, at 192–93. 
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years.118  This was largely due to an increase in mortgage securitization,119 a 
process by which notes on homes are bundled together, rated, and sold to 
investors.120  The lenders received cash payments for the loans, often hundreds 
of millions of dollars. 121   From 1990 to 2007, most mortgage loans were 
securitized.122 
The growth of securitization and its eventual scope are shocking.  In 1994, 
$11.05 billion worth of subprime loans were securitized.123  In 2005 and 2006, 
the total value of securitized subprime loans reached roughly $990 billion.124  
Hungry investment banks and a false sense that the investments were solid 
facilitated this rapid growth.  In most cases, the rating agencies gave the bundles 
of securitized loans an AAA rating, the highest score available, which endorsed 
the bundles as safe investments. 125   This created an incentive for  
non-traditional lenders to make as many large-sum loans as possible.126  As a 
result, making exotic loans became attractive because such loans ensured that 
initial payments were lower so customers could—and would—borrow more.127  
The lenders in no way expected that they would collect on the loans for the full 
thirty years, but the lenders’ agents and loan brokers had a financial incentive to 
place borrowers in expensive loans.128 
Furthermore, Wall Street created sophisticated ways to turn notes into 
securities, which generated new problems.129  In order to avoid regulations that 
would limit what a bank or company could earn, the bank or company could 
split responsibilities for bundles of notes.130  This created mass confusion.  There 
                                                            
 118. See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 99, at 657. 
 119. See Oppenheim & Trask-Rahn, supra note 88, at 751–52 (explaining that the appeal of 
securitization is that it eliminates the risk to the lenders who sell the loans to investors). 
 120. See Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime 
Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1266 (2009); see also Renuart, supra note 5, at 117 n.11. 
 121. Wall Street, for a variety of reasons beyond the scope of this article, gobbled up the notes 
and called for more.  See David E. Woolley & Lisa D. Herzog, MERs: The Unreported Effects of 
Lost Chain of Title on Real Property Owners, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 365, 380 (2012) (quoting 
Yasha Levine, How An Obscure Outfit Called MERS Is Subverting Our Entire System of Property 
Rights, ALTERNET (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.alternet.org/story/149189/how_an_obscure 
_outfit_called_mers_is_subverting_our_entire_system_of_property_rights). 
 122. White, supra note 30, at 471–72. 
 123. See Renuart, supra note 5, at 118. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Woolley & Herzog, supra note 121, at 380 & n.79. 
 126. See Bader, supra note 45, at 774–75. 
 127. See Salsich, supra note 15, at 19. 
 128. SMITH, supra note 99, at 222–23 (explaining that “When Risk Is Everywhere, It’s 
Nowhere”).  Smith explains that, because the original lenders did not retain risk, they did not care 
about the risk of default.  See id.  Similarly, because the investment bank that bought the loans sold 
the returns to investors, it did not care about the risk either.  See id. 
 129. Vieth, supra note 19, at 12:00. 
 130. See Eggert, supra note 120, at 1263.  In a traditional deal, a depositor would gather the 
notes and place them in a trust managed by a trustee, typically a large bank.  Renuart, supra note 
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is evidence that lenders often mishandled endorsements of notes, resulting in a 
number of problematic practices, including the forgery of necessary assignments 
(robo-signing).131  During the height of subprime lending, many notes were 
neither endorsed nor delivered to the parties who were meant to “hold the 
note.”132  This created situations in which banks sued other banks for foreclosing 
on properties for which each believed it was the holder of the note. 
The net result was that mass securitization exacerbated the problem of making 
risky loans without underwriting by discouraging review of the loan’s validity 
and by creating an environment in which note transfers and collection of 
payments were often problematic. 
3.  The Rise of Private Recordings and the Resulting Loss of Land Recording 
Transparency: Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems 
Securitization also affected the recordings of notes and deeds.  Traditionally, 
the recorder of deeds documented the transfer of a deed from one party to 
another, which required a fee.133  This fee, which averages thirty-five dollars, 
was not a large expense to local banks.134  However, deeds that could pass from 
a lender to a subsequent buyer to a depositor to a trust could cost hundreds of 
dollars per borrower. 135   Also, because notes were pooled into bundles of 
thousands, and because those bundles could be from every state and represent 
hundreds of counties, recording was both expensive and complex. 136  
Consequently, the financial industry commissioned studies to determine how 
much could be saved by creating a private recording system.137  The result of 
this evaluation was Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS).  As 
Dean Christopher Peterson explains, 
In the mid-1990s, some mortgage bankers decided they no longer 
wanted to pay recording fees for assigning mortgages.   Securitization-
a process of pooling many mortgages into a trust and selling income 
from the trust to investors on Wall Street-drove this decision. . . .  To 
avoid the hassle and expense of paying county recording fees, these 
mortgage bankers formed a plan to create a single shell company that 
would pretend to own all the mortgages in the country.  According to 
the plan, the mortgage bankers would never have to record 
assignments again because the same company would always “own” 
                                                            
5, at 118–19.  A second bank, the servicer, would collect the payments, and a third bank, the trust 
custodian, would hold the notes.  Id. 
 131. See White, supra note 30, at 474–75. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Peterson, supra note 10, at 114–15. 
 134. Id. at 115. 
 135. Cf. id. (explaining that a new recording system was created because mortgage bankers did 
not want to pay the several recording fees associated with assigning loans). 
 136. See id. at 116 (discussing the consequences of securitization). 
 137. See id. at 147. 
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all the mortgages. They incorporated the shell company in Delaware 
and called it Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. . . .  
Because the new system cut out payment of county recording fees, 
recording was significantly cheaper for intermediary mortgage 
companies and the investment banks that packaged mortgage 
securities. Acting on the impulse to maximize profits by avoiding 
payment of fees to county governments, much of the national 
residential mortgage market shifted to the new proxy recording system 
in only a few years.138 
The financial industry has saved billions of dollars by using MERS.139 
MERS is pervasive.  Today, MERS records approximately sixty percent of 
residential mortgages.140  The consequence of MERS is that homeowners are 
unable to use a public office to track who owns the titles to their mortgages.141  
That information is restricted to the private members of MERS.142  For example, 
before MERS, homeowners could potentially track the ownership their property 
back to the 1700s; however, if the same individual purchased a home in 2007 or 
2008, he may not even be able to determine who currently holds the note.143  As 
Peterson points out, “[f]or the first time in the nation’s history, there is no longer 
an authoritative, public record of who owns land in each county.”144 
MERS’s lack of transparency is a serious problem.  Although complications 
could perhaps be avoided if MERS’s private records were accurate, it is clear 
that they are not.145  According to one survey, of 396 cases from six judicial 
foreclosure states, only twenty percent of those listing MERS as the mortgagee 
of record correctly identified the individual or entity with the right to foreclose 
on the property.146  Another study revealed that MERS’s electronic records of 
holders of notes and deeds of trusts only match the public records about twelve 
percent of the time.147  Similarly, a study conducted by the San Francisco Office 
of the Assessor-Recorder reported that the identity of the deed of trust 
beneficiary in the public records only matched the investor identified in the 
                                                            
 138. Id. at 116–17 (internal citations omitted). 
 139. Id. at 114. 
 140. Id. at 117 (noting that “the mortgages are recorded in the name of MERS Inc., rather than 
[in the name of] the bank, trust, or company that actually has a meaningful economic interest in the 
repayment of the debt”). 
 141. See Salsich, supra note 15, at 35. 
 142. Peterson, supra note 10, at 132. 
 143. See id. at 114–15 (“Since the founding of the American republic, each county in the 
United States has maintained records of who owns the land within that county”). 
 144. Id. at 117. 
 145. See Marsh, supra note 24, at 24–25 (proposing a new recording system that encourages 
transparency). 
 146. White, supra note 30, at 486. 
 147. Id. at 502. 
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MERS database forty-two percent of the time.148   The disconnect between 
MERS’s internal records and the public recordings may result from MERS’s 
failure to supervise its internal database.149  Currently, MERS simply grants 
access to members to record transfers if they wish to do so.150  The use of MERS 
in the vast majority of loans leads to confusion regarding who has standing to 
foreclose.   This makes the job of a trustee both more critical and more difficult. 
4.  The Rise of Foreclosure Rates and the Collapse of the World Economy 
The impact of reckless lending and poor record keeping is well known.  As 
loan rates were adjusted, fewer and fewer borrowers could repay, and many were 
forced to refinance.151  However, as home values stagnated, lenders did not want 
to refinance because the property, in many cases, was worth less than the note.  
These “underwater” notes became common, and default rates hit historic 
highs.152  The results were crushing for more than just homeowners. 
By 2008, many of the major companies in the financial industry reported 
earnings losses and other financial difficulties.153  Since then, companies have 
gone out of business completely.154  The broader market collapse was historic 
and just as severe.  After the Dow Jones Industrial average reported a record 
                                                            
 148. See AEQUITAS, FORECLOSURE IN CALIFORNIA: A CRISIS OF COMPLIANCE 13 (2012), 
available at http:// aequitasaudit.com/images/aequitas_sf_report.pdf.  The study found that in 
twenty-seven percent of cases, the mortgage assignment was signed by the servicer or trustee rather 
than the original lender, and in eleven percent of cases, the assignee signed the assignments on 
behalf of the assignor.  Id. 
 149. Peterson, supra note 10, at 127. 
 150. Id.  Compounding the problem is the fact that MERS’s private records are not only 
inaccurate, but they are also opaque.  Id. at 130.  Although the MERS database can be searched, 
doing so often reveals the following message: “Investor: This investor has chosen not to display 
their information. For assistance, please contact the servicer.”  Id.  As a result, many of MERS’s 
records are truly private.  Id.  Furthermore, MERS keeps no physical copy of any documents that 
support the entry.  Id. at 129.  The result is an unreliable recording system.  Interestingly, MERS 
does not dispute this characterization, but rather issues a disclaimer to all members who search the 
database: 
DISCLAIMER: MERS makes no representations or warranties regarding the accuracy 
or reliability of the information provided.  MERS disclaims responsibility or liability for 
errors, omissions, and the accuracy of any information provided.  MERS does not input 
any of the information found on the MERS System, but rather the MERS Members have 
that responsibility regarding mortgage loans in which they hold an interest.  Users of this 
information have the responsibility to verify the accuracy, currency and completeness of 
the information.  The information does not constitute the official legal record and is for 
informational purposes only.  The servicer listed should be contacted for further 
information. 
Id. at 127–28. 
 151. See Vieth, supra note 19, at 18:45. 
 152. Salsich, supra note 15, at 20. 
 153. Pittman, supra note 77, at 1103. 
 154. Id. (noting that Morgan Stanely, Washington Mutual, UBS, Freddic Mac, Bank of 
America, Wachovia, Bear Stearns, Countrywide, Merril Lynch, and Wells Fargo all reported 
decreased earnings and record-breaking write downs). 
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high of 14,164.53 on October 9, 2007, it fell to below 7,000 by March 2, 2009.155  
Although this decline was not as deep as the Great Depression, it was actually 
steeper because values declined in half the time.156  Mortgage securitization, 
coupled with subprime lending and poor risk analysis by lenders and investors, 
drove the global economy into recession.157 
As a result of the market collapse, several major banks, insurers, and lenders 
failed, and those that did not fail required a government bailout to stay afloat.  
Meanwhile, millions of families faced foreclosure. 158   Despite government 
efforts to encourage loan modifications, the foreclosure rate was at its historic 
highest, and foreclosures continue to occur at staggering rates.159 
5.  Flaws of the Modern Mortgage Era 
There are a multitude of potential problems with the modern foreclosure 
system that make the trustee’s job more difficult.  Trustees are often faced with 
loans that might have been fraudulent from the outset, lost documents, servicers 
that collect payments but are not note holders, opaque recording, and other 
issues. 160   There are fundamental questions about the validity of many 
foreclosures because of the likelihood that problems exist.161  These problems 
give rise to cases like Ron Meehow’s and the Bank of America phantom 
foreclosure. 
                                                            
 155. Dow Jones Industrial Average, DOW JONES INDEXES (Dec. 31, 2011) 
http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/brochure_info/Dow_Jones_Industrial_Average 
_Brochure.pdf. 
 156. The Great Depression caused a ninety-percent loss in value, which was much deeper than 
the 2008 decline.  Compare id., with Market Turbulence Questions and Answers, THE STANDARD 
1 (March 2009), http://www.standard.com/pensions/publications/QA-Market 
-Turbulence.pdf (reporting a ninety-percent loss in value).  However, the Great Depression’s 
decline spanned over three years, which was a much more gradual decline than 2008’s  
eighteen-month drop.  MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40198, THE 2007-2009 
RECESSION: SIMILARITIES TO AND DIFFERENCE FROM THE PAST 1, 8 (2010). 
 157. See Renuart, supra note 5, at 115. 
 158. Id. at 4. 
 159. See Vieth, supra note 19, at 19:35. 
 160. See Renuart, supra note 55, at 564 (noting that the non-exhaustive list of problems 
includes: “the failure to provide contractually or legally required notices; lack of authority for 
foreclose; fraud in the process; rigging the sale; grossly inadequate sale price; and other irregularity 
or unfairness”).  There is no reason to believe these problems will be solved in the near future.  
Instead, they have proven relatively intractable.  Recently, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau has created more rigorous standards for foreclosures, focusing on the servicer’s role.  See 
Morgan Brennan, Could New, Tighter Mortgage Rules Actually Ease Lending?, FORBES (Jan. 1, 
2013, 6:24 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/morganbrennan/2013/01/10/could 
-the-new-mortgage-rules-actually-ease-tight-lending/.  However, if past governmental programs in 
the mortgage industry are any indication, the industry will struggle to comply and problems will 
persist.  See id. 
 161. See Renuart, supra note 55, at 564. 
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III.  NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE AND THE ROLE OF TRUSTEES 
An examination of non-judicial foreclosure procedure highlights the 
importance of the trustee and why it is likely that the most egregious foreclosure 
abuses are occurring in non-judicial foreclosure states.162 
A.  Non-Judicial Foreclosure 
The first time a borrower learns that foreclosure might occur is usually when 
they receive a debt collection notice.163  The lender sends notice, usually in the 
form of a letter, indicating that the homeowner is behind on the loan and that, if 
he does not pay a specified amount, the lender will initiate foreclosure.164  The 
actual foreclosure process begins with specific notice that the homeowner is in 
default and foreclosure proceedings have commenced.165  The type of notice and 
how much time must elapse following the notice before a foreclosure sale can 
occur differs from state to state.  Most states require some form of published 
notice, as well as notice mailed directly to the borrower.166  Notice periods differ 
drastically; depending on state law, the entire foreclosure process can be 
completed in twenty days or in one hundred and twenty days.167  Often, the 
trustee who is responsible for initiating the foreclosure proceedings sends 
notice.168  This trustee is usually not the original trustee named in a deed of trust, 
but rather is a trustee typically appointed by the lender pursuant to its power to 
appoint a successor trustee.169 
Homeowners in every non-judicial foreclosure state struggle to find legal 
representation, both because of their financial situations and because there is a 
genuine deficit of consumer lawyers who are able to navigate foreclosure law.170  
The shorter the notice period is, the more likely it is that a homeowner will be 
                                                            
 162. For a far more detailed review of non-judicial foreclosure, particularly the lack of judicial 
oversight, and its contrast with judicial foreclosure, see Renuart, supra note 5, at 139–41. 
 163. See Molly F. Jacobson-Greany, Setting Aside Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sales: Extending 
the Rule to Cover Both Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud or Unfairness, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 
139, 147 (2006). 
 164. Renuart, supra note 5, at 140. 
 165. Jacobson-Greany, supra note 163; see also Mark S. Pécheck & Kelsey M. Lestor, The 
ABCs of California Foreclosure Law, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2012, at 13 (providing a comprehensive 
overview of how judicial foreclosure is comparable to non-judicial foreclosure in most states, 
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 166. Jacobson-Greany, supra note 163, at 148. 
 167. Renuart, supra note 55, at 564.  California has one of the longest notice periods with three 
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with twenty days.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 443.325.3 (West 2013). 
 168. Renuart, supra note 5, at 140. 
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L., FORECLOSURES: A CRISIS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION 12, 14 (2009), available at 
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esReport.pdf. 
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unable to obtain the legal help necessary to take meaningful steps to stop the 
foreclosure. 171   Even non-profit organizations are often forced to turn 
homeowners away because by the time notice is received, read, and the borrower 
realizes he needs help, the sale is often less than ten days away.  It is common 
for homeowners to contact the trustee to request more time, contest the amount 
owed, or inquire about the foreclosing party.172 
The homeowner can stop foreclosure in only a few ways.173  He can reinstate 
the loan by paying a specified amount, hire a lawyer and seek a temporary 
restraining order or preliminary injunction,174  file bankruptcy, 175  attempt to 
convince the lender to delay or cancel the foreclosure,176 or ask the trustee to 
delay the sale.177  In any other situation the foreclosure proceeds to sale, often 
referred to as “auction.”178  The “English auction,” in which potential bidders 
gather in a common, public place, is the most common method of sale.179  At the 
sale, it is the trustee’s duty to obtain the highest possible price for the home.180  
In theory, it is in the best interests of both the foreclosing bank and the 
homeowner to sell the home for a high price.  A high sales price helps the bank 
recover most or all of the cost of the loan and may allow the homeowner to avoid 
or limit a deficiency.181  The trustee is also charged with taking bids at the sale 
and executing a trustee’s deed that conveys the property to new the buyer.182  
Depending on the state, the homeowner may have up to one year to attempt to 
redeem the property.183  In many states, if the homeowner does not redeem, he 
is liable for the deficiency, while other states prohibit deficiencies altogether.184 
                                                            
 171. For example, in Missouri, which requires only a twenty-day notice, homeowners almost 
never obtain representation prior to the foreclosure sale.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 443.325.3 (West 2013). 
 172. See Jacobson-Greany, supra note 163, at 148. 
 173. See Pécheck & Lestor, supra note 165, at 14. 
 174. Timothy J. Peterkin, Getting to the Arguments: How Legitimate Defenses to Foreclosure 
are Raised, 3 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 253, 261 (2012). 
 175. Williams, supra note 23, at 470–71 (describing the parallel between the rise in foreclosure 
filings and the rise bankruptcy filings). 
 176. Pécheck & Lestor, supra note 165, at 14. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 30, at 1415. 
 179. Id. at 1416. 
 180. JUDON FAMBROUGH, REAL ESTATE CTR., TEX. A&M U., A HOMEOWNER’S RIGHTS 
UNDER FORECLOSURE 3 (2009) (“Regardless of who serves as trustee, the trustee’s sole duty is to 
conduct the sale in a prescribed manner to reduce the loan as much as possible by securing a fair 
price.”); see also Jacobson-Greany, supra note 163, at 149 (noting that the auctioneer typically sells 
the property to the highest bidder). 
 181. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 30, at 1404–05. 
 182. See Jacobson-Greany, supra note 163, at 149–50. 
 183. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 30, at 1404 (“A concept commonly termed ‘statutory 
redemption’ allows the mortgagor-debtor—and, in many states, junior lienholders—up to a year or 
longer to regain title after the foreclosure sale by paying the foreclosure purchaser the sale price 
plus accrued interest and other expenses.”). 
 184. Id. at 1404–05. 
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In reality, the auction format is inefficient and homes are routinely sold for far 
less than their actual worth.185  This is primarily because there is no real market 
created for the home.  The publication notice is often printed in obscure 
publications and only contains a legal description of the property, without 
providing the address, a photograph, or description of the home. 186  
Additionally, the trustee does not typically show the home to potential buyers, 
both because the homeowner is often still living there, and, because notice 
periods are often relatively short, leaving little time for buyers to become aware 
of or even consider purchasing the property.187 
Consequently, the bidders at foreclosure sales are almost exclusively 
professional homeflippers or the very financial institutions that foreclosed on the 
properties up for sale.188  For example, a common sale may involve Chase Bank 
initiating foreclosure, the trustee offering the property for sale, Chase Bank 
placing the only bid, and the trustee selling the home for significantly less than 
both the outstanding balance of the loan and the fair market value of the home.189  
Chase is then free to clean the house, advertise it meaningfully by listing it with 
an agent, show it to prospective buyers, wait for a fair offer, and sell the house 
at a profit. 
Any difference between the sales price and the balance of the loan is addressed 
in one of three ways.  In some states, the difference between the sales price and 
the amount owed on the note is a deficiency that can be collected against the 
homeowner.190  This adds insult to injury because the homeowner loses his 
home, has his credit destroyed, and then faces additional crushing debt.191  Some 
states limit the deficiency to the difference between the fair market value of the 
home and the balance of the loan.192  Others prohibit deficiencies entirely to 
ensure that, if homeowners are foreclosed upon, they can start over without a 
burdensome debt.193 
After a foreclosure sale, the buyer must often send the former homeowner a 
notice by mail or post a notice on his door informing him that he must vacate the 
house.194  If the former homeowner does not leave, either because he does not 
believe that the foreclosure was valid or because he has nowhere else to go, the 
                                                            
 185. See id. at 1417–18 (explaining some of the reasons why homes fail to sell for full market 
value at auction sales). 
 186. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 187. See id. 
 188. Vieth, supra note 19, at 28:40. 
 189. See id. at 28:50 (providing a similar example). 
 190. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 30, at 1404–05. 
 191. Id. at 1429. 
 192. Walsh, supra note 30, at 144. 
 193. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 194. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Smith, 392 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (noting 
that the successor trustee sent notice of the foreclosure sale by registered mail to the homeowner). 
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buyer will initiate an unlawful detainer action.195  This is typically a summary 
proceeding in which the buyer asks a court to evict the former owner and to 
award damages for the amount of time the former owner held over.196  As a 
result, in non-judicial foreclosure states, the first time a homeowner in default is 
likely to come before the court is when he is sued for failing to vacate his former 
home.197 
Unlawful detainers pose significant hurdles for homeowners.198   In some 
states, homeowners are prohibited from asserting that the foreclosure was 
wrongful and therefore void.199  In other states, homeowners can challenge title, 
but this presumes the homeowner can obtain a qualified lawyer.200  In either 
case, the most common result is a local sheriff removing the former owner under 
a court order that requires him to pay for living in his own home.201 
B.  The Current Role of Trustees in Non-Judicial Foreclosures 
In many states, trustees are deeply imbedded in every step of the foreclosure 
process.  While the law requires the trustee to act as a neutral, the trustee 
typically takes on multiple roles, many of which are contradictory.202  It is not 
uncommon for the trustee to serve as a debt collector, the attorney for the 
bank,203 the party with the power to appoint a successor trustee, the successor 
trustee, an agent for MERS who assigns mortgage documents during the 
foreclosure, the attorney who opposes the homeowner if he attempts to stop the 
                                                            
 195. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 12, 19–20, 392 S.W.3d 446 (No. 92649) (describing a 
case in which the homeowner refused to leave after the foreclosure sale, causing the trustee to 
commence an unlawful detainer action). 
 196. See Smith, 392 S.W.3d at 453–54 (considering a challenge to the “summary nature” of 
Missouri’s unlawful detainer statute and describing an unlawful detainer action as one against a 
party who “began possession lawfully but remained on the land wrongfully after their possessory 
right ended”); Brief for Appellant, supra note 195, at 20 (noting that the trial court required the 
appellants to pay damages for the time they remained their home during the unlawful detainer action 
brought against them by the foreclosing bank); see also Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, 
supra note 1 (characterizing the “action to kick the homeowner out of the house after the foreclosure 
sale” as an unlawful detainer action). 
 197. Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 198. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 195, at 57 (noting that, following foreclosure, “[t]he 
homeowner suffers irreparable harm, as the house is almost invariably sold, and the homeowner 
can face garnishments for double damages due to the unlawful detainer judgment”). 
 199. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See Williams, supra note 23, at 472 (noting that local sheriffs often deliver eviction 
notices, writs of possession, or writs of unlawful detainer). 
 202. Peterkin, supra note 174, at 274.  Timothy Peterkin seems to be the only author who has 
clearly suggested that the trustee is a central part of the foreclosure problem.  Id. at 283–84.  
Peterkin undoubtedly discovered this fact in his practice at the Foreclosure Defense Project.  See 
id. at 253 n.1.  He proposes that borrowers should be informed of the role of the trustee as a neutral 
who may have conflicts of interest with the borrower because the trustee is also a representative of 
the foreclosing entity.  Id. at 277.  However, this is only a mild solution to the larger problem. 
 203. See id. at 274; see also Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
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foreclosure, the coordinator and direct or indirect provider of title services, the 
attorney who represents the buyer after foreclosure, and the coordinator of 
“default services”—the  process of removing the homeowner from the home, 
cleaning up the home, and preparing it for sale.204  This is a staggering number 
of roles to fill, which causes conflicts that are at the heart of some of the most 
egregious foreclosure problems.205 
A debt collection notice is usually the first contact a homeowner has with an 
entity other than the lender regarding the status of his loan.206  Often, a law firm 
who is also the trustee or owns a trustee corporation sends the notice.207  If the 
homeowner does not dispute the debt or reinstate the loan, the next document 
the homeowner receives is a foreclosure notice from the trustee.208  In many 
cases, the trustee and the debt collector are the same law firm.209 
How can the attorney for the bank become the trustee?  A deed of trust, which 
is created at the time a loan is made, lists a third party trustee to whom both the 
homeowner and the lender agreed at the time of contract.210   However, that 
trustee almost never oversees the foreclosure because the deed of trust contains 
a provision that allows the lender to appoint a successor trustee.211  The deed of 
trust typically delegates this power to the bank’s attorney, who then appoints 
himself as the trustee.212  Accordingly, the successor trustee is almost always 
either the bank’s foreclosure attorney, who works for a foreclosure mill,213 or a 
trustee who works for a trustee company owned by the attorneys for the bank.  
There is a conflict in either case, but the situation is even more complex in the 
modern mortgage era.  Not only does the bank hand pick the theoretically neutral 
trustee to carry out foreclosure, the bank, in some cases, authorizes the successor 
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Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. On Housing and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th 
Cong. 282, at 18 (2010) (statement of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center) (explaining that, in one survey of foreclosure filings in Pennsylvania—a 
judicial foreclosure state—the note was not filed with the complaint in over sixty percent of the 
cases and suggesting that “[f]ailure to attach the note appears to be routine practice for some of the 
foreclosure mill law firms”); see also Renuart, supra note 5, at 122 (referring to “foreclosure 
mills”); Woolley & Herzog, supra note 121, at 372 (defining a foreclosure mill as a law firm “that 
specialize[s] in quick processing of thousands of foreclosures for banks”). 
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trustee to appoint itself.214  Similarly, the parties to the foreclosure also require 
title work if the property is deeded to the new buyer.  In some states, the 
foreclosure mills that serve as trustees also perform this title work.215 
If the homeowner believes that the foreclosure is improper, he often raises his 
concerns to the trustee.216  However, because the trustee works for the bank, he 
routinely fails to answer calls and letters and ignores serious factual 
complaints.217  In Ron Meehow’s case, the trustee attorney admitted that he 
deferred to whatever the bank told him to do.  This is a questionable position for 
the only neutral in a non-judicial foreclosure. 
It is also not uncommon for a supposedly neutral trustee to appear at a trial 
against homeowners who have filed for temporary restraining orders.218  It is 
difficult to comprehend that a trustee who advocates against the homeowner is 
simultaneously fulfilling his duty of neutrality.  However, this is permissible in 
many states.219 
If the foreclosure sale goes forward, the trustee carries out the sale. 220  
Although the trustee has a legal duty to sell the home for the highest possible 
price, there is commonly only one bid at the foreclosure sale, which is often is 
placed by a trustee on behalf of the foreclosing bank.221  In other cases, Fannie 
Mae or another large institution, also potential clients of the trustee’s law firm, 
buy the home.222  These conflicts call into question whether the trustee would 
ever postpone the foreclosure sale in order to solicit a higher price, which is 
                                                            
 214. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, Appointment of Successor Trustee (Oct. 8, 2008) (example 
of loan document) (on file with author) (appointing a successor trustee to the proceeding).  The 
bank appoints a sucessor trustee by giving the law firm a limited power of attorney, which includes 
the power to self-appoint.  The law firm, as the attorney for the bank, then files the appropriate 
document appointing itself the successor trustee.  See id. (providing an example).  The attorney 
who signed the example Appointment of Successor Trustee is also an employee of Kozeny  
& McCubbin, the entity being appointed successor trustee.  See id.  Coincidentally, Kozeny  
& McCubbin is also a regular attorney for Wells Fargo.  See id. 
 215. For example, in Missouri, one of the largest foreclosure mills and successor trustees is 
Millsap & Singer, a law firm owned by Vern Singer.  Another large foreclosure mill and successor 
trustee outfit in Missouri is South & Associates, a law firm owned by Allen South.  A public records 
search reveals Allen South and Vern Singer own a title company together, see Robin Carnahan, 
Mo. Sec’y State, 2012 Annual Registration Report (Mar. 8, 2012), available at 
https://www.sos.mo.gov/BusinessEntity (search for “Continental Title Holding Co.”), which 
provides foreclosure services, Information for Borrowers, MILLSAP & SINGER, LLC, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20101218074117/http://msfirm.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). 
 216. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Peterkin, supra note 174, at 275. 
 219. See, e.g., id. (noting that this behavior is permissible under the North Carolina Rules of 
Professional Conduct). 
 220. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1 (explaining that the trustee often 
works for the foreclosing bank and initiates and carries out proceedings on behalf of the bank). 
 221. See id. (noting that the foreclosing bank normally does not even send its own 
representative and instead relies on the trustee to make the bid). 
 222. Id. 
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allowed by most state laws.223  They also call into question whether the trustee, 
who has discretion in where and how to publish notice of the sale,224 will work 
diligently to obtain the highest price, which likely involves finding bidders who 
would compete with the trustee’s own clients. 
Once the home is sold, the trustee files a trustee’s deed.225  This deed affirms 
that the underlying conditions for foreclosure—as set out in the deed of  
trust—were met, affirms that the property was sold at the sale, and vests title in 
the buyer.226  The trustee’s affirmative attestation that the homeowner defaulted 
and that the proper party foreclosed is potentially improper, given that it is likely 
the trustee has no actual knowledge of whether default occurred.  And, in cases 
liked Ron’s, the trustee has ample reason to question default. 
To conclude the foreclosure proceedings, the trustee charges a “trustee fee” to 
the homeowner.227  This is sometimes in addition to attorney’s fees, for which 
the homeowner is also responsible.228  The result is that the homeowner could 
potentially pay the trustee for being both an attorney and a trustee. 
After foreclosure, the buyer of the foreclosed property typically retains a law 
firm to file a lawsuit to evict the homeowner.229  The new owner, often a large 
bank (and sometimes the same bank that foreclosed), hires the same attorney 
that served as the trustee or owned the trustee company.230  Consequently, the 
trustee who owed a duty of neutrality to the homeowner now represents the 
buyer against the former owner.  The buyer’s attorney appears in court, seeks to 
evict the homeowner, and then requests damages from the homeowner for 
continuing to occupy the home.  This routinely occurs even if the homeowner 
questioned the validity of the foreclosure, and even if the trustee had 
questionable information about whether default occurred, the lender induced the 
default, or the lender had standing to foreclose at all. 
After the court orders the homeowner to vacate, some foreclosure firms 
provide “default servicing,” by which the firm coordinates with companies to 
remove any remaining belongings from the home and prepare the house for 
sale.231  This often includes throwing out whatever the homeowner did not have 
the time or money to remove.232 
                                                            
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. 
 225. Jacobson-Greany, supra note 163, at 149. 
 226. Id. at 149–50. 
 227. Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See, e.g., Eviction, MILLSAP & SINGER, LLC, http://web.archive.org/web 
/20101218074434/http://msfirm.com/EvictionMO.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) (“Millsap  
& Singer, LLC routinely handles eviction related matters for mortgage lenders after foreclosure.”).  
These are the same “mortgage lenders” that appoint Millsap as a “neutral” trustee. 
 231. Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 232. See id. 
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C.  The Structural Dynamics That Prevent Trustees From Remaining Neutral 
Under the current law, trustees have the potential to act unfairly because of 
the lack of regulation by both state governments and the courts.  At a minimum, 
the current structure makes it highly unlikely that trustees will serve as a true 
neutral that provides a check on the sometimes-unreliable representations of 
banks. 
There are several reasons trustees are ineffective.  First, there is the repeat 
player effect.  Even if trustees do not work for banks, they regularly interact with 
banks.  Conversely, for the homeowners, relationships with trustees are brief and 
isolated.  It is widely accepted in cognitive science that repetition builds trust, 
drawing the inference that repeat business between trustees and banks inherently 
develops trusting relationships.233 
Second, trustees are unregulated and untrained.  Because no law describes 
what trustees must review in order to proceed with a foreclosure, there is no one 
to supervise trustees’ actions.  Furthermore, trustees are not formally 
trained,making it unlikely that even a well-meaning trustee could—or  
would—ask the right questions.  Foreclosure is no longer a simple matter.  It 
involves complex transfers of notes and deeds of trust,234 complicated servicing 
records, and a variety of other matters. 
Third, the current economic structure does not encourage trustees to work 
fairly or carefully.  Instead, all economic incentives encourage aggressive 
foreclosures without any evidence that the foreclosures are proper.235  Trustees 
have major incentives to ignore complaints from homeowners regarding 
potential issues with the foreclosure proceedings. 
There are both external and internal financial pressures on trustees.  
Externally, the bank pays the foreclosure firm.  There are many firms available 
for the bank to hire.  The bank is most interested in fast, easy foreclosures and 
reducing costs.  The bank also pays the foreclosure mill for the debt collection 
work, the appointment of successor trustee work, the trustee work itself, and the 
unlawful detainer work.  The foreclosure mill may also receive payment for title 
work and default servicing.  All of this is built on a model that requires volume.  
Foreclosure mills openly advertise bulk rates for foreclosures with surprisingly 
low costs.  For example, a conventional foreclosure costs approximately $650, 
                                                            
 233. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 66–67 (2011) (explaining that 
“repetition induces cognitive ease and a comfortable feeling of familiarity” and that “[t]he link 
between positive emotion and cognitive ease . . . has a long evolutionary history”). 
 234. For a comprehensive explanation of the significant number of cases that have revealed 
problems with the transfer of notes and the security instrument, see Renuart, supra note 5, at 120 
nn.17–18. 
 235. See Peterkin, supra note 174, at 275–76 (arguing that a “trustee had no incentive to be a 
neutral, passive participant” during the foreclosure process because he will only collect commission 
if the matter is resolved in favor of the lender). 
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and an unlawful detainer action may cost an additional $350.236  The attorneys 
will not get rich working on one foreclosure, but they are getting rich working 
on thousands.  If the firm were to start asking hard questions of banks, such as, 
“Where is the proof that this note was transferred to you?” or “Why is the 
homeowner providing payment records that don’t match yours?” or “Why aren’t 
you the party that appears in the recording records?” or “Are you sure that using 
MERS is appropriate?” it would risk losing very profitable repeat business.  As 
a result, the firm’s interests align with the bank’s, at the expense of homeowners. 
Internally, there are additional pressures on trustees.  Foreclosure mills 
function on a model that has a relatively low number of attorneys and a larger 
support staff. 237   The foreclosure process is meant to be form driven, and 
unlawful detainer work is largely a matter of taking defaults.  Many foreclosure 
firms hire attorneys with limited experience in other fields of law and young 
attorneys hungry for work to attend the bulk docket calls related to evictions.238   
These attorneys lack the time, inclination, incentives, and resources to 
investigate each foreclosure and to consider the homeowners’ factual 
disputes.239  Often, these attorneys even lack the time and inclination to return 
calls to homeowners or their attorneys when foreclosure is imminent. 
Some foreclosure mills make no secret of the fact that they operate as bulk 
practices that seek to expedite foreclosures for banks.  The former homepage of 
                                                            
 236. See, e.g., Fees and Expenses Schedule, MILLSAP & SINGER, LLC, http://web.archive.org 
/web/20101218074634/http://msfirm.com/FeesAndCosts.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). 
 237. See, e.g., Directory, MILLSAP & SINGER, LLC, http://web.archive.org/web 
/20101218074901/http://msfirm.com/Directory.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) (listing eighteen 
attorneys and eighty support staff).  Millsap & Singer is representative of the typical staff structure 
of a foreclosure mill.  The titles are interesting, as people at a firm that provides trustee services 
along with representation to banks are identified under categories such as “sales,” “evictions,” and 
“title,” revealing the true “one-stop-shop” nature of many foreclosure firms.  Id. 
 238. Bulk dockets are court dockets that can contain hundreds of cases, all set for the same 
time.  See, e.g., Foreclosure Cases: Orange County, NINTH JUD. CIRCUIT FLA. (Nov. 27, 2012), 
http://www.ninthcircuit.org/programs-services/foreclosures/Downloads/ForeclosureProcedures 
-11-5-2012.pdf.  This type of docket works because most of the defendants fail to appear or are 
convinced to accept a consent judgment by the plaintiffs’ attorneys.  Bulk dockets are especially 
common in debt collection cases and unlawful detainers because one plaintiff, such as a large bank 
that buys homes at foreclosure, may have dozens of cases on the docket that relate to the same 
subject matter but have different defendants.  The plaintiff files the cases all at once so that they 
will be set on the same day, thereby reducing the expense to the plaintiff because one attorney can 
handle all of the cases. 
 239. Peterkin, supra note 174, at 275–76. 
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Millsap & Singer,240 one of the largest foreclosure mills in the Midwest,241 
proudly asserted that Millsap “provides comprehensive default servicing” and 
has done so for the “mortgage banking industry since 1970.”242  The website 
also noted that Millsap “actively and aggressively pursue[s] all possible avenues 
to reduce timeframe and expenses”243 when foreclosing or removing debtors 
from their homes.  The website also contained prices for many of the services 
the firm offered.244 
The Millsap story is not unique.  Similarly, Northwest Trustee Services is a 
separate trustee company that conducts foreclosures in Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington, and also has close 
ties to a large foreclosure law firm.245  Northwest’s website, although not quite 
as egregious as Millsap’s, is similarly telling.  For example, Northwest openly 
states on its website that it maintains an alliance with Routh Crabtree Olsen, 
P.S.246  Northwest makes the relationship even more explicit on another page, 
stating that it is “[a]ssociated with sister law firm, Routh Crabtree Olsen, P.S., 
which conducts judicial foreclosures in our coverage area.”247  These statements 
make neutrality hard to imagine, given that Routh Crabtree’s website identifies 
the firm as a “full service mortgage banking law firm dedicated to representing 
creditor’s rights.” 248    Northwest’s website also advertises that “Northwest 
Trustee Services, Inc. is a full-service trustee company providing default 
services to mortgage lenders in the Western United States.” 249   Northwest 
promises to provide a fee schedule to anyone who fills out the form, which 
requires a listing of the financial institution with which the person or institution 
is affiliated.250  Of course, Northwest’s website does not contain promises to be 
                                                            
 240. In theory, Millsap & Singer, P.C. and Millsap & Singer, LLC are separate entities, one 
claiming to handle foreclosures and one claiming to be a trustee.  An Internet search returns 
different results for each.  However, the search for both entities returns the same website, which 
indicates that the firms have the same website, the same leadership, the same address, the same 
employees, and the same phone numbers.  See Home, MILLSAP & SINGER, LLC, 
http://www.msfirm.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).  At a minimum, the firms are closely affiliated. 
 241. Joe Harris, Class Blows Whistle on Foreclosure Firm, COURTHOUSE NEWS (Nov. 22, 
2011, 8:11 AM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/11/22/41641.htm. 
 242. Information for Borrowers, supra note 215. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Fees and Expenses Schedule, supra note 236. 
 245. Home, NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVS. INC., http://www.northwesttrustee.com/ (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Northwest Home]. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Company Profile, supra note 20. 
 248. Welcome to RCO, RCO, http://www.rcolegal.com/# (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). 
 249. Northwest Home, supra note 245. 
 250. Fee Schedule, NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVS. INC., http://www.northwesttrustee.com 
/FeeSchedule.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). 
136 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:103 
neutral to borrowers, nor does it proudly announce an alliance with a consumer 
right’s law firm.251 
The examples of Millsap and Northwest demonstrate that the current system 
is inadequate to protect homeowners and to assure society as a whole that rule 
of law is governing foreclosures.  The problem is immense, but simple, practical 
solutions can offer immediate improvement by converting trustees from a 
significant part of the problem to an integral part of the solution. 
IV.  RE-ENVISIONING THE ROLE OF THE TRUSTEE 
The role of the trustee in non-judicial foreclosures is central, but neither case 
law nor literature examines it in the context of modern mortgage structure.  This 
is likely because, until recently, foreclosures were rarely controversial.  
However, given the current realities, it is time to rethink the role of the trustee.  
The trustee is a gatekeeper who, if marshaled for the cause, can serve as a  
stop-gap for many of the abuses that occur throughout the foreclosure process.  
This will not replace the need for pre-foreclosure mediation252 or the need to 
reform and regulate the bad loans, sloppy recordkeeping253 and robo-perjury that 
created the foreclosure crisis, but it will provide immediate relief for affected 
homeowners like Ron Meehow.  Empowering the trustee to verify the legitimacy 
of foreclosures is also valuable because it enlists an already-existing third party, 
which addresses the concern that the existing programs that require the 
foreclosing entity advise homeowners about modification before foreclosure but 
do not require the involvement of a third party, leave homeowners vulnerable.254  
For example, in the case of Ron, who lost his home despite making payments, a 
neutral trustee could have avoided the entire problem by listening to Ron’s 
                                                            
 251. For an interesting commentary on Northwest, see The Face of Evil: Northwest Trustee 
Services—The West’s “David J. Stern”, SOCIAL APOCALYPSE (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://theresalbaker.typepad.com/social_apocalypse/2013/01/the-face-of-evil-northwest-trustee 
-services-the-wests-david-j-stern.html (alleging that Steven Routh, the CEO of Northwest, buys 
and creates newspapers to publish foreclosures, and also brags about the money to be made from 
the business of foreclosure); see also Jeff Manning, Northwest Trustee Services Squeezes More 
Profits From Home Foreclosures with One-stop Model, OREGON BUSINESS NEWS (Jan. 14, 2012, 
10:27 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2012/01/northwest_trustee_squeezes 
_mor.html (criticizing Routh).  Interestingly, the Social Apocalypse blog includes a simple 
declarative statement that has some implications for the role of trustees: “Foreclosure should not 
be able to be initiated, facilitated, perpetuated or adjudicated by ANY entity who PROFITS from 
it.  Period.”  The Face of Evil, supra. 
 252. See Renuart, supra note 55, at 576 (noting that many states have adopted a  
pre-foreclosure mediation requirement to help mitigate the consequences of foreclosure); see also 
Renuart, supra note 5, at 167–68 (discussing the Nevada foreclosure statute and its mediation 
requirement). 
 253. See Renuart, supra note 5, at 173 (discussing the challenges parties to a foreclosure face 
because of sloppy or incorrect paperwork). 
 254. Walsh, supra note 30, at 160 (arguing that programs in California, Michigan, 
Massachusetts, and Oregon do not require the involvement of third parties and are therefore 
insufficient to protect homeowners). 
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concerns and asking basic questions to discern who had the right to foreclose 
and what evidence of default existed.  Empowering the trustee to do these things 
will facilitate a better system. 
The role of the trustee can be reformed in three ways: (1) legislative reform, 
(2) impact litigation, and (3) ethical complaints.  These methods of reform can 
be combined if appropriate. 
First, state governments should pass legislation that would make trustees 
effective gatekeepers who require essential proofs, ask basic questions, and, 
when factual disputes arise between the foreclosing party and the homeowner, 
refer those questions to the courts.  The challenge is that may simply not be an 
option some states. 
Second, courts in some states may be ready to consider legal arguments that 
challenge the current behavior of trustees.  Such cases would be aimed at 
providing courts with factual scenarios like Ron’s and asking them to apply the 
existing law to these new and challenging modern mortgage dilemmas. 
Finally, in states in which legislation and litigation may not be viable 
solutions, state bar associations and legal ethics bodies can address the ethical 
concerns that arise when an attorney represents a bank versus a homeowner.  
States can consider ethical issues through advisory opinions and specific 
complaints about attorneys who have engaged in potentially unethical behavior. 
A.  Legislation 
Legislation is the most comprehensive and desirable way to change the role 
of the trustee.  It would allow for clear standards, regulation, and penalties.  The 
specific language of any bill must be crafted to fit the nuances that exist in each 
state.  Legislation regulating trustees has the potential to create a ripple effect in 
the foreclosure world, causing banks to consider more carefully whether they 
should initiate foreclosure and providing homeowners with meaningful rights to 
question suspicious and invalid foreclosures. 255   Ultimately, the proposed 
legislation provides a mechanism by which to resolve difficult cases in which 
homeowners and banks disagree so that valid foreclosures can still proceed.  In 
situations in which the homeowner has challenged the validity of the foreclosure, 
the bank would have an incentive to consider carefully whether modifying the 
loan or dropping the matter entirely would be more appropriate or more 
profitable.256 
                                                            
 255. See Willis Carpenter, A Brief History of Colorado’s Public Trustee System, COLO. LAW, 
Feb. 2002, at 67 (noting that Colorado, the only state with a public trustee system, has created a 
framework to provide for truly neutral trustees who have no financial incentive to obey the banks 
and who have the necessary training and oversight). 
 256. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is currently drafting 
a proposed uniform body of law for foreclosures titled “Residential Real Estate Mortgage 
Foreclosure Process and Protections.”  NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAW, 
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCESS AND PROTECTIONS (2012), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residential%20Real%20Estate 
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1.  A Six-Prong Reform Proposal 
An effective trustee reform statute has six prongs: (1) a record requirement; 
(2) insulation from other parties; (3) prohibition of foreclosure if legal or factual 
disputes arise; (4) penalties; (5) licensing; and (6) education. 
a.  Record Requirement 
Many problems relating to records can cause questionable or illegal 
foreclosures.  The first problem is the failure to keep adequate records of notes 
transferred into securitized trusts.257  In some cases, the original notes were 
destroyed, or the transfers were botched, giving rise to questions about who has 
the right to foreclose.258  In other cases, various documents were falsified.259 
Second, the inherent problems of MERS 260  and issue with the public 
recording system in general261  give rise to troubling fact patterns; it is not 
uncommon for the party foreclosing to suddenly appear in the land records, with 
no chain of title explaining how they came to be the secured party.262 
In other cases, the records themselves are inconsistent.  The appointment of 
the successor trustee may have occurred after the foreclosure, or the  
self-appointed trustee may not have had the power of attorney to do so.263  
Additionally, in some foreclosures, no record indicates that the foreclosing party 
has the legal standing to foreclose.264  In any case, the trustee rarely seeks 
documentation; he simply trusts the bank’s representation.265 
Finally, there are serious problems with keeping records of payments.  The 
federal government recently alleged that the country’s largest loan servicers 
engaged in negligent and unfair practices,266 such as losing payments, refusing 
                                                            
%20Mortgage%20Foreclosure%20Process%20and%20Protections/2013feb4_RREMFPP_MtgDr
aft.pdf.  The committee consists of a variety of individuals, including consumer advocates, lender 
advocates, and others.  See id.  However, a review of the draft indicates that it does not address the 
trustee problem is.  See id.  Draft Section 601 states that a borrower in a non-judicial foreclosure 
state would need to seek an injunction in order to stop a sale, rather than utilize the trustee as a 
gatekeeper.  Id. at 59. 
 257. Renuart, supra note 5, at 119. 
 258. See Renuart, supra note 55, at 564 (describing the problems that can arise during the 
foreclosure process). 
 259. Woolley & Herzog, supra note 121, at 373.  In these cases, servicers re-created documents 
that were missing from files and employees with no training or personal knowledge of the matter 
often signed affidavits attesting to the fact that all the documents were in order.  Id. at 372–73. 
 260. See supra notes 145–150 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with MERS). 
 261. Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 262. See Woolley & Herzog, supra note 121, at 381 (detailing the various public recording 
problems related to foreclosures). 
 263. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 264. See id. 
 265. See id. 
 266. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & Office of the Comptroller of 
Currency, supra note 70. 
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to provide debtors information about how much they owed on their loans,  
dual-tracking—one department promises a modification while the other 
forecloses—and failing to fulfill valid modification requests.267  Although the 
servicers settled the claims for $25 billion,268 this is unlikely to resolve the 
problems completely.  Consequently, there are still serious questions about 
whether debtors are actually in default.  In some cases, homeowners were 
promised modifications, made the trial period payments, and then did not receive 
the permanent modification they were promised.  In other cases, the homeowner 
may be current on payments but, due to a change in his loan servicer, there is no 
record of his payments. 
To address these problems, a trustee reform statute must explicitly require 
trustees to maintain physical records that verify essential facts of the transaction.  
Specifically, a statute should require: 
1. Proof of the transfer of the original note from the original lender to 
the foreclosing party, including any and all intervening assignments.  
The foreclosing party should be required to produce a copy of the 
original note and attest in a sworn affidavit that it holds the note in its 
original form.269 
2. Proof that the foreclosing party is the secured party of public record. 
Additionally, the secured party of record should be required to produce 
all records that show how it became secured. 
3. Detailed financial records that show when default occurred and how 
much money the homeowner currently owes.270 
4. Documents detailing any modification discussions that occurred 
and documents showing the results of each modification review. 
5. Documents proving that the bank had the power to appoint the 
successor trustee. 
If the trustee were required by law to demand these documents, it would be a 
simple task.  Trustee firms could train employees to review document packets 
presented by the foreclosing party.  If the documents are deficient, the trustee 
would send them back to the lender with instructions to cure. 
                                                            
 267. Williams, supra note 23, at 468–69 (describing the dual-track process). 
 268. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, $25 Billion Mortgage Servicing Agreement Filed in 
Federal Court (Mar. 12, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/March/12-asg 
-306.html. 
 269. Nevada has enacted a law that has similar requirements.  NEV. SUPER. CT. MEDIATION R. 
11; Renuart, supra note 55, at 576.  It provides for voluntary pre-foreclosure mediation.  NEV. 
SUPER. CT. MEDIATION R. 11.  If the homeowner demands mediation, the foreclosing entity must 
provide “the original or certified copy of the deed of trust; the loan note; and each assignment or 
transfer of the deed of trust and note.”  Renuart, supra note 55, at 576. 
 270. This would be similar to the data the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has 
recently indicated it will require servicers to provide to homeowners.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1070.1–4 
(2013) (providing an overview of the CFPB). 
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This simple requirement would stop the most egregious foreclosures.  Ron, 
who made all of his payments, would still be in his home because the bank could 
not have produced records of missed payments.  Either the trustee would have 
rejected the bank’s paperwork, or, as the bank learned the system, it would never 
have initiated foreclosure in the first place. 
b.  Insulation From Other Parties 
The proposed recording requirements will be most effective if the trustee is 
truly neutral.  Otherwise, close questions would likely be resolved in favor of 
the banks.  Insulation of the trustee from the banks is relatively easy to achieve.  
A trustee reform statute should prohibit any attorney who has served as counsel 
for either party in the foreclosure from serving as trustee.  This ensures that the 
trustee does not have a conflict of interest.  At the same time, this still leaves a 
vast array of attorneys who are qualified to be a trustee.  This statutory 
requirement could inspire trustee firms to develop solid foreclosure practices.  
Firms could still handle foreclosures in bulk, but they would have clear guidance 
concerning the required documentation. 
c.  Prohibition of Foreclosure If Legal or Factual Disputes Arise 
Requiring trustees to cease foreclosure activity when legal or factual disputes 
arise should be common sense.  However, no statute explicitly requires this 
result.  Trustees are not trained to resolve disputes that arise between the parties, 
but, in practice, the trustee resolves a dispute every time he accepts the bank’s 
version of the facts over the borrower’s.271 
Typically, a homeowner argues that he was promised a modification and that 
he made the requisite payments, but the bank claims that it has no record of the 
modification or the payments.  This presents a legal question (whether the 
promise to modify the loan is a binding contract) and a factual question (whether 
the bank made a promise and whether the homeowner accepted).  If the bank 
breached a binding promise to the homeowner, foreclosure is inappropriate.  
However, under the current system, the trustee normally proceeds with the 
foreclosure and ignores the homeowner’s complaint, as many trustees believe 
that they have no duty to investigate.272  This may be true, but as soon as he 
believes one party’s story over the other’s, the trustee has ceased to be neutral. 
The solution to this problem is simple.  A trustee reform statute should require 
that, if a dispute between the parties arises concerning the right to foreclose, the 
trustee must file a document in the public record stating that the foreclosure 
cannot proceed until the dispute is resolved.  As a result, both the bank and the 
homeowner will be forced to consider whether their claims are valid.  If the bank 
determines it has a legal right to foreclose, it can proceed in court with a judicial 
foreclosure.  If the bank prevails, the statute should allow the bank to recover 
                                                            
 271. See Telephone Interview with Erich Vieth, supra note 1. 
 272. See id. 
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damages for the time the homeowner remained in the home.  This will 
discourage homeowners from filing frivolous claims only to cause delay.  This 
solution puts legal and factual disputes where they belong: in courts that have 
considerable expertise in deciding such matters.273 
d.  Penalties 
The first three prongs of the trustee reform statute carefully explain what a 
trustee must and must not do.  However, there is always the potential for a rogue 
trustee.  Therefore, a trustee reform statute should include penalties for any 
violation of the statute.  The statute should also include a right of action for 
homeowners, to recover actual and punitive damages as well as attorney’s 
fees.274  In this way, the statute would mirror consumer fraud statutes, such as 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),275 the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA),276 and many state consumer fraud acts.  The statute should also 
explicitly state that, if the state’s civil procedure rules are satisfied, a class action 
is an available remedy. 
e.  Licensing 
A trustee reform statute should also contain a provision detailing how trustees 
are licensed and regulated.  The contours of this provision would depend on the 
state.  At a minimum, trustees should be bonded277 and should be required to 
meet basic standards, such as refraining from any affiliation with commercial 
lenders, declining to represent consumers or homeowners, and complying with 
the statutory requirements.  States should develop and administer a basic 
licensing exam for trustees, and should task a particular entity, such as a division 
of finance or its equivalent, with trustee oversight and the annual inspection of 
trustee files.  Regulatory penalties for the failure to meet licensing requirements 
coupled with the statute’s private right of action will provide the best 
                                                            
 273. This portion of the proposal bears some resemblance to one of the more interesting rescue 
measures put in place during the Great Depression, an era in which many state legislators sought 
to curb foreclosures.  See Walsh, supra note 30, at 139–40.  In some states, homeowners were given 
the power to convert non-judicial foreclosures to judicial foreclosures.  Id. at 140.  In this proposal, 
the trustee triggers this change in order to avoid factual disputes about a person’s home being 
resolved extra-judicially. 
 274. Cf. Timothy A. Froehle, Note, Standing in the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis: Why 
Procedural Requirements Are Necessary to Prevent Further Loss to Homeowners, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 1719, 1743 (2011) (making a similar suggestion to allow attorney’s fees under general 
foreclosure statutes for any cause of action related to foreclosures). 
 275. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 813, 91 Stat. 874, 881 
(1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012)) (providing for civil penalties). 
 276. See Act of Oct. 26, 1970, § 125, 84 Stat. 1114, 1117 (codified as amended at  
15 U.S.C. § 1681n–o (2012)) (providing for civil penalties). 
 277. A bond provides some guarantee that, if the trustee breaks the law, the injured party can 
recover.  It also requires the trustee to have an interest and helpsensure that the state is aware of 
who the trustee is on any given mortgage.  See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. 456.7-702 (West 2013) 
(requiring a trustee “to give bond to secure performance” at the request of the court). 
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enforcement scheme.  The need for a combination of public and private 
enforcement is apparent in fields as varied as employment law, debt collection, 
environmental protection, and securities.278 
f.  Education 
Both trustees and the public require more education.  If states create licensing 
requirements for trustees, and preferably licensing structures, the market will 
likely create classes and courses to train trustees.  Educating trustees is essential; 
however, educating the public is just as important.  An ideal trustee reform 
statute should specifically provide for the implementation of basic campaigns to 
educated the public about new protections for homeowners. 
2.  The Promise of a Trustee Reform Statute and the Challenges That Must 
Be Addressed 
A trustee reform statute would almost immediately alter the landscape of 
foreclosures.  Things would improve if banks could no longer handpick trustees 
to facilitate quick foreclosures.  If trustees act as true neutrals, an unfair and 
untrained trustee will no longer decide disputed foreclosures.  Instead, the 
dispute would be sent to the courts, which have developed sophisticated 
mechanisms for resolving factual and legal disputes.  Similarly, requiring the 
trustee to obtain essential foreclosure documents from banks would help to keep 
the banks honest.  If the bank has a problem with its records, it will need to 
correct the error or contact the homeowner and attempt to modify the loan. 
The suggested trustee reform statute would reduce the number of illegal 
foreclosures, and in some cases, prolong the foreclosure process.  Many 
government programs, lawsuits, and other efforts have been aimed at keeping 
people in their homes.279  This is beneficial to the homeowner, but it is also 
beneficial to the broader economy.  Home prices plummeted after the market 
meltdown and the unprecedented foreclosure rate. Requiring banks to carefully 
consider whether they should remove people from homes, rather than forcing 
out homeowners as quickly as possible, is a fair result.  And if foreclosure is 
appropriate, the courts can resolve the matter and award damages to the bank.  
There is no downside to requiring trustees to act as true neutrals.  The only 
possible result is a reduction in wrongful foreclosures, an increase in 
modifications, and overall increase in the certainty that property rights are being 
appropriately protected. 
Implementing a trustee reform statute has many challenges.  First, it is 
essential to educate lawmakers about current problems.  Second, the field must 
                                                            
 278. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1196–97 (1982) (recognizing the importance of a combination of public and 
private enforcement). 
 279. See Susan Jaffe, Caregivers Aim to Trim Costs by Helping Seniors Stay at Home, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 21, 2010, at E1, E5 (describing PACE, a federal program aimed at keeping seniors in 
their homes). 
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find ways to attract competent trustees.  Currently, trustees in most states are 
compensated with percentage of the home’s sale price.280  This structure rewards 
foreclosure and discourages the investigation of potential problems.  One 
possible solution would require the bank to compensate the trustee if the 
foreclosure is initiated but does not proceed, and require the homeowner to pay 
the trustee if the foreclosure does proceed.  The compensation rates should be 
established state by state and be based market demands.  This structure may 
require an increase in trustees’ fees because they could no longer be paid by 
several parties in the same action.  Another possibility for compensation is to 
implement a public employee program, like the system in Colorado.281 
Finally, some may argue that these proposals will increase the length of 
foreclosure and the overall costs to banks, which could pass on costs to 
consumers.  However, it is important to remember that banks currently foreclose 
haphazardly, thereby avoiding the costs it would normally bear. 282   At a 
macroeconomic level, the glut of foreclosed homes, the ever-present specter of 
litigation over the foreclosures, and the economic harm foreclosed families 
experience are devastating to the economy.283  Reducing wrongful foreclosure 
could have a number of positive impacts on the economy as a whole. 
B.  Litigation 
In many states, the legislatures are unlikely to pass a trustee reform statute.284  
However, the judiciary in these states may allow for partial reform through 
                                                            
 280. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 443.360 (West 2013) (providing the trustee with “a 
commission on the amount of sales not exceeding two percent on the first one thousand dollars, 
and one percent on all sums over that amount and under five thousand dollars, and one-half of one 
percent on all sums over that amount”).  One may think that because trustees are paid based on the 
sales price at the foreclosure sale, there is an incentive to sell the house for the highest possible 
price.  However, the auction system discourages competition and thereby reduces the sales price.  
Second, trustees make far more for the other services they provide to the bank than they do for 
selling the home.  For example, in Missouri, a home that sells for $100,000 at a foreclosure sale 
would produce a return of $535.  See id.  This law also discourages a trustee from seeking to 
maximize the sales price because, as the bid goes up, the return to the trustee is proportionally less, 
so that increased effort results in decreased gains.  See id.  If the trustee made a special effort, and 
sold the house for $150,000 instead of $200,000, the increased return would only be $250.  See id.  
The trustee could instead invest this same effort in taking on another case for a bank, involving debt 
collection, foreclosure work, unlawful detainer work, default servicing, title work, and publication 
of notice.  The current system is not incentivizing trustees to seek the highest bid, especially if 
doing so would risk a steady, lucrative stream of businesses from banks. 
 281. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-101 (2012) (establishing a public trustee system in Colorado). 
 282. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, Big Banks Are Told to Review Their 
Own Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2013, at B1 (highlighting the problems caused by 
imperfect foreclosure procedures). 
 283. Pittman, supra note 77, at 1104. 
 284. See, e.g., HOME, 2011 LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES REPORT (2011), available at 
http://www.phonehome.org/Portals/0/Images/PDF/Legislative%20Outcomes%202011.pdf (noting 
that, in Virginia, “most of the various foreclosure reform bills were killed outright”). 
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litigation.  Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to document the law 
in every state, it is helpful to consider the law in a few example states. 
1.  California 
a.  California Law 
Of the four states surveyed, California demands the least of trustees.  
California law is unique because trustees do not have fiduciary duties to both 
parties, and they have limited statutory immunity.285  Kachlon v. Markowitz 
demonstrates the range of claims that can be pursued against trustees in 
California, revealing a small window of permissible actions, such as claims of 
genuine bias.286  In Kachlon, a homeowner sued the trustee and the note holder, 
alleging that the trustee incorrectly recorded a notice of default. 287   The 
homeowner further alleged that he provided proof to the trustee that the $53,000 
promissory note at issue had been satisfied.288  In response, the trustee refused 
to proceed with the foreclosure and refused to withdraw the notice of default.289  
Essentially, the trustee refused to take sides.290  The plaintiffs brought a slander 
of title claim and a negligence claim.291  The court ultimately upheld a directed 
verdict in favor of the trustee, explaining that “[t]he trustee in nonjudicial 
foreclosure is not a true trustee with fiduciary duties, but rather a common agent 
for the trustor and beneficiary.  The scope and nature of the trustee’s duties are 
exclusively defined by the deed of trust and the governing statutes. No other 
common law duties exist.”292 
The court also explored California’s statutory “privilege,” which provides 
immunity to trustees for actions taken within the scope of their ordinary duties, 
such as mailing, publication, and the delivery of notice.293  The court concluded 
that the statute provides limited immunity, specifically excluding malicious 
conduct.294  The court clarified that “[m]ere negligence in making ‘a sufficient 
                                                            
 285. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(b) (West 2013); see also Kachlon v. Markowitz, 85 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 532, 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  Arizona has a similar limited immunity statute.  See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 33-807(E) (2012) (“If the trustee is joined as a party in any [action other than one 
alleging the trustee breached its duties under the statutory scheme], the trustee is entitled to be 
immediately dismissed and to recover costs and reasonable attorney fees from the person joining 
the trustee.”).  Id. 
 286. 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532. 
 287. Id. at 538–42. 
 288. Id. at 541. 
 289. Id. at 553. 
 290. Id. at 554. 
 291. Id. at 553. 
 292. Id. at 546. 
 293. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (b), (d) (West 2013). 
 294. Kachlon, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 550–51 (“Granting absolute immunity from such wrongdoing 
would wholly sacrifice the trustor’s interest in favor of the trustee. The qualified common interest 
privilege, on the other hand, would provide a significant level of protection to trustees, leaving 
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inquiry into the facts on which the statement [about default] was based’ does 
not, of itself, relinquish the privilege.”295 
The Kachlon court’s decision is instructive.  Although it makes clear that a 
trustee is not liable for negligence, it leaves open the possibility that a claim 
could be brought in California against a trustee who is working for the bank, and 
who disregards information provided by the homeowner.  As such, although a 
claim to curb the practices by some abusive trustees may be difficult, it does not 
seem impossible. 
b.  Could Ron Meehow’s Claim Survive in California? 
In Kachlon, the court noted that the trustee stopped the foreclosure procedure 
after the homeowner provided evidence that he was not in default.296  The court 
relied heavily upon this behavior to determine that the trustee did not act with 
malice.297  In Ron’s case, the trustee continued the foreclosure, despite evidence 
that Ron did not default on his loan.  The trustee even affirmatively explained 
his behavior, suggesting it was because he worked for the bank. 
California law leaves room for claims like Ron’s.  The trustee’s actions in his 
case would likely be sufficient to establish malice.  Such claims would serve the 
high purpose of defining the parameters for trustees and curbing some of their 
more egregious behavior. 
2.  Missouri 
a.  Missouri Law 
The law governing trustees in Missouri is ripe for review.  Trustees in 
Missouri are rarely held accountable for illegal behavior, in large part because 
wronged homeowners have not pursued cases in the modern mortgage era.  
However, Missouri law seems to support claims against trustees.  An early 
Missouri case described the role of the trustee as follows: 
Trustees are considered as the agents of both parties-debtor and 
creditor-and their action in performing the duties of their trust should 
be conducted with the strictest impartiality and integrity.  They are 
intrusted with the important function of transferring one man’s 
property to another, and therefore both reason and justice will exact of 
them the most scrupulous fidelity.  Courts of equity have always 
watched their proceedings with a jealous and scrutinizing eye; and 
where it is clearly shown that they have abused their trust, or combined 
with one party to the detriment of the other, relief will be granted.  Not 
                                                            
them open to liability only if they act with malice. At the same time, it preserves the ability of 
trustors to protect against the wrongful loss of property caused by a trustee’s malicious acts.”). 
 295. Id. at 554 (quoting Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 540, 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1970)). 
 296. Id. at 553. 
 297. Id. at 554. 
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that a sale made by them will be set aside on slight and frivolous 
grounds; but where it appears that substantial injury has resulted from 
their action, where, in pursuance of their powers, they have failed or 
neglected to exercise a wise and sound discretion, equity will interfere.  
It is impossible in the very nature of things to lay down any precise 
rule applicable alike to all cases which may arise, but every case must 
be decided on the especial facts and circumstances which surround it 
and upon which it is founded.298 
Other Missouri case law seems to suggest that a trustee has, at least, a duty to 
conduct a “reasonable investigation” into default.299  And since 1846, Missouri 
courts have rejected the notion that the trustee does not have specific duties and 
is merely the agent of the lender.300 
Missouri courts describe the role of the trustee as sacred.  Missouri’s vision 
of the trustee is representative of the ideal trustee of the modern mortgage era.  
The decisions seem to suggest that a trustee could never openly promote itself 
as an agent for the lender, nor could a trustee choose to ignore information from 
the homeowner regarding fraud or negligence by the lender.  Thus, if a claim is 
pursued against a trustee who has acted in this manner, he should be liable.  
Whether the law will produce these results remains to be seen. 
b.  Could Ron Meehow’s Claim Survive in Missouri? 
The case on which Ron’s story is based was filed in Missouri, and it survived 
a motion to dismiss.301  This was appropriate under Missouri law and suggests 
that Missouri is ripe for claims against trustees that allege overt bias.  These 
claims would be beneficial to Missourians facing foreclosure because they 
would define the parameters of the trustee and serve to curb some of the more 
offensive and troubling behaviors of trustees. 
3.  Washington 
Washington law provides an unusual amount of detail and precedent 
regarding trustees.  However, there are few cases that have tested that law in the 
modern mortgage era.  Additionally, Washington is home to Northwest Trustee 
Services, a company that raises serious questions about the relationship between 
trustees and foreclosure attorneys.  As a result, claims in Washington may be 
                                                            
 298. Goode v. Comfort, 39 Mo. 313, 325 (1866). 
 299. See Edwards v. Smith, 322 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1959) (noting that there was no 
evidence that a reasonable investigation would have turned up a reason not to foreclose, but 
seeming to suggest that the trustee could have been liable had such evidence existed). 
 300. Vail v. Jacobs, 62 Mo. 130, 133–34 (1876) (“Neither the law nor the parties intend that 
the trustee shall be a nose of wax, a mere figure-head, in the hands of the creditor and of the 
auctioneer.  He is placed in a position to act fairly by all interested, and when he fails in his duty in 
this regard, the sales he makes will be set aside.”). 
 301. Order, Rippy v. Chase Bank, No. 1111CV06677 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 2012) (denying 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
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especially effective in more fully defining the role of the trustee and preventing 
some of the more serious problems associated with the foreclosure process. 
a.  Washington Law 
Washington is unique because it has clear precedent that sets forth principles 
to guide the interpretation of its deed of trust statute, and because two cases, 
separated by over twenty years, hold trustees liable for breaching their duty of 
neutrality.302  Washington courts have articulated three principles to guide the 
interpretation of the deed for trust act: “First, the nonjudicial foreclosure process 
should remain efficient and inexpensive. Second, the process should provide an 
adequate opportunity for interested parties to prevent wrongful foreclosure. 
Third, the process should promote the stability of land titles.”303  Similarly, 
Washington law indicates that a trustee is a fiduciary to both the lender and the 
borrower.304 
These principles require trustees to be truly neutral.  In Washington, if the 
trustee is merely an agent for the lender, the trustee can be individually liable for 
the breach of its duties.  For example, in Cox v. Helenius, the court held that the 
trustee, who was the attorney for both the homeowner and the bank, breached 
his fiduciary duty by foreclosing on the homeowner’s property and selling the 
home despite knowing that the homeowner mistakenly believed that a pending 
action for damages against the creditor had stopped the foreclosure. 305  
Interestingly, the court noted that the breach may have been a result of the 
trustee’s dual role.306  The court further suggested that, when such a conflict 
arises, the party should either act as the trustee or the attorney, but not both.307 
                                                            
 302. See Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 295 P.3d 1179 (Wash. 2013) (en banc); Cox v. Helenius, 
693 P.2d 683 (Wash. 1895) (en banc). 
 303. Cox, 693 P.2d at 685–86. 
 304. Id. at 686 (“Washington courts do not require a trustee to make sure that a grantor is 
protecting his or her own interest. However, a trustee of a deed of trust is a fiduciary for both the 
mortgagee and mortgagor and must act impartially between them.”). 
 305. Id. at 684–85. 
 306. Id. at 687. 
 307. Id.  The court explained that 
the dual responsibility of trustee and attorney for the beneficiary precipitated at least 
some of the trustee’s breaches. Although the dual role this trustee had troubles us, the 
Legislature specifically amended the statute in 1975 to allow an employee, agent or 
subsidiary of a beneficiary to also be a trustee. The amendment furthers the general intent 
of the act that nonjudicial foreclosure be efficient and inexpensive, and in the ordinary 
case would present no problem. However, the statute may not allow attorneys to do that 
which the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits. The spirit of CPR DR 5–105(B) 
would seem to condemn action of the nature that occurred here. Where an actual conflict 
of interest arises, the person serving as trustee and beneficiary should prevent a breach 
by transferring one role to another person. 
Id. 
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In 2013, Klem v. Washington Mutual Bank confirmed that Cox is still good 
law.308  In Klem, Dorothy Halstien, through her legal guardian, filed claims for 
negligence, breach of contract, and violation of Washington’s Consumer 
Protection Act (CPA).309  The jury returned a verdict for Ms. Halstein on all 
three counts.310 
Ms. Halstein owned a home worth approximately $235,000 on which she 
owed roughly $75,000. 311   Washington Mutual (WaMu) held the note and 
Quality Loan Services (Quality) was the trustee.312  Ms. Halstein also suffered 
form dementia and, due to the cost of her care, her guardian was unable to pay 
her mortgage. 313   Consequently, WaMu instructed Quality to initiate 
foreclosure.314  On the first day the law allowed, Quality sold the home for 
$84,087.67, a dollar more than Ms. Halstien owed in principle, fees, and costs.315  
To accomplish the sale, a notary employed by Quality falsely predated the notice 
of sale, which authorized the sale to occur earlier than it should have.316 
Before the sale, Halstien’s guardian secured a signed purchase and sale 
agreement for the home from a buyer who committed to pay $235,000.317  The 
parties could not close the sale before the foreclosure sale, so the guardian 
requested a postponement of the sale.318  Although Washington law gives the 
trustee absolute authority to postpone the sale, the trustee declined to do so, 
explaining that it would not postpone the sale without WaMu’s permission.319  
Evidence revealed that the trustee, in a confidential exchange between it and 
WaMu, promised to never postpone a foreclosure unless WaMu agreed.320  
Similarly, Quality’s chief operating officer confirmed that Quality did what 
“WaMu told it to do.”321  The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Ms. 
Halstein’s guardian.322  On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court concluded 
that the CPA applied to trustees and that a trustee could be held responsible for 
acting unfairly. 323   The court also held that a trustee could be liable for 
negligence.324 
                                                            
 308. See 295 P.3d 1179, 1188 (Wash. 2013) (en banc) (citing Cox with approval). 
 309. Id. at 1183. 
 310. Id. at 1184. 
 311. Id. at 1181. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 1181, 1183. 
 315. Id. at 1181. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 1182–83. 
 321. Id. at 1183. 
 322. Id. at 1184. 
 323. Id. at 1190. 
 324. Id. at 1181 (affirming the intermediate appellate court). 
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The court reasoned that, because the trustee has enormous power over another 
individual’s home, the law and equity demand that the trustee be fair and just.325  
The court also noted that lenders, servicers, and their affiliates routinely appoint 
trustees,326 giving the trustees an incentive to accommodate the wishes of the 
entity that appoints them.327  Additionally, the court emphasized that trustees 
should act as neutrals, commenting that the laws of Washington do not permit 
the “theft” of a person’s home by a lender “under the guise of a statutory 
nonjudicial foreclosure.”328  The court explicitly rejected the argument that the 
trustee may follow the beneficiary’s direction, reasoning that the transaction 
would no longer involve three distinct parties because the trustee would merely 
serve as the beneficiary’s agent.329  Finally, the court indicated that a trustee’s 
failure to act as an independent and neutral party exercise is an unfair or 
deceptive practice.330  To prevent further abuse, the court ordered an injunction 
to prevent Quality from continuing to violate the law and remanded the matter 
to the trial court.331 
These two cases establish fundamental principles that, if accepted by other 
states, would change foreclosure procedure.  Accordingly, state courts should 
construe deed of trust laws in favor of the borrower, require trustees to exercise 
independent discretion as a true third party, and carefully scrutinize a trustee’s 
close ties to the lender to address any issues with impartiality.  Klem and Cox 
indicate that courts will establish real limits on trustees if attorneys bring 
compelling cases against them. 
b.  Could Ron Meehow’s Claim Survive in Washington? 
Although the ultimate fate of Ron’s claim turns on several factors, including 
venue, the judge, and the attorneys, it is likely that Ron’s claim would survive if 
filed in a Washington court.  The Washington Supreme Court explicitly 
concluded that failure to act as an independent decision maker exposes a trustee 
to liability.332  Like the trustee in Klem, Ron’s trustee admitted that it does what 
the bank instructs it to do.  This is a breach of the trustee’s duty. 
Washington stands as the clearest example of the value of bringing claims 
against trustees who are tethered to banks and unwilling to act as a true third 
party.  If advocates bring similar claims in other states that have similar laws, 
                                                            
 325. Id. at 1188 (“[T]he power to sell another person’s property, often the family home, is a 
tremendous power to vest in anyone’s hands.” As a result, “common law and equity require[] [a] 
trustee[] to be evenhanded to both sides and to strictly follow the law.”). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. at 1188–89. 
 328. Id. at 1189. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. at 1192. 
 331. Id. at 1188–90. 
 332. Id. at 1190. 
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such as Missouri, it is likely that courts can play a role in curbing the harmful 
behavior of many modern day trustees. 
4.  Specific Factual Scenarios That Are Ripe for Pursuit 
Although the trustee problems that are ripe for litigation differ by state, basic 
issues that should be considered include: 
close financial ties between trustees and banks, including potential 
indemnity agreements; 
the conflict between advocating zealously for a bank (required under 
most ethical rules) and the legal duty to be completely neutral; 
a trustee’s willingness to actually advocate against a homeowner in 
temporary restraining order or bankruptcy proceedings; 
a trustee’s failure to require proof of the right to foreclose, including 
documents that would prove standing, security, and default; 
a trustee’s decision to resolve factual or legal disputes about standing 
or default in favor of the bank; 
a trustee’s refusal to talk with a homeowner; and 
a trustee’s decision to give advice to homeowners, which could create 
an attorney/client relationship. 
Pursuing these types of issues will have a number of salutary effects.  First, 
litigation will provide much needed guidance and answers.  Second, clarification 
of these issues will help to stop illegal or unethical behavior.  Third, addressing 
these issues will allow for discovery that could better illuminate the relationship 
between banks and trustees.  And fourth, considering these issues will likely 
cause those who are acting as attorneys and as trustees to scrutinize their own 
practices more carefully. 
This reformation process is already beginning.  In the case on which Ron’s 
story is based, the trustee was named and the claim survived a motion to 
dismiss.333  Ron’s case, and other cases like it, could provide much-needed 
clarification of the trustee’s duties in the modern era. 
C.  Ethics Complaints 
Because most trustees are also lawyers, they are subject to the professional 
conduct rules in their jurisdictions.334  Moreover, most states allow attorneys to 
seek advisory opinions in potentially unethical situations.335  Therefore, filing 
appropriate ethical complaints and ethical inquiries may help to address the most 
overt forms of abuse by trustee attorneys. 
                                                            
 333. Order, Rippy v. Chase Bank, No. 1111CV06677 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 2012) (denying 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
 334. Cox v. Helenius, 693 P.2d 683, 687 (Wash. 1985). 
 335. See, e.g., Committee on Mediator Ethical Guidance, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (June 
6, 2013), http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=DR018600. 
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1.  Ethical Rules on Which to Base Complaints Against Trustees 
The Cox court pointed out that, although Washington allows attorneys to both 
represent banks and serve as the trustee, the attorney must still not engage in 
activity prohibited by the state’s code of professional responsibility.336  The 
court further suggested that the trustee in Cox, who served the interests of the 
bank to the detriment of the homeowner, may have violated the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MPRC).337  According to 
section 5-105, “[a] lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise 
of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely 
to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be 
likely to involve him in representing differing interests.” 338   The court’s 
reference to this rule suggests an interesting possibility.  The court implied that 
when an attorney elects to become a trustee and thereby takes on a legal fiduciary 
duty to a borrower, the attorney becomes the legal representative of the 
borrower.339 
Although the court did not identify at what point the borrower and the trustee 
enter into an attorney-client relationship, guidance is available.  Typically, 
courts look to the client’s intent in determining if an attorney-client relationship 
exists.340  If this is true, then a borrower, who contacts a trustee knowing that the 
trustee is a lawyer and that the trustee is required to help him, may have a 
reasonable expectation that the trustee is acting as his lawyer. 
Similarly, the MRPC dictate how the trustee should interact with the 
borrower, even absent an attorney-client relationship.  MRPC 4.3 explains that 
[i]n dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented 
by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is 
disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that 
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the 
matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the 
misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an 
unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a 
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with 
the interests of the client.341 
Under this rule, if the homeowner is represented, the attorney should not speak 
with him.  At the same time, the trustee still owes a duty to the homeowner and 
must provide him with information.  If the homeowner is unrepresented, the 
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trustee must disclose its adverse interests, and the only advice it may give to the 
homeowner is to seek counsel.  Telling the homeowner to reinstate the loan by 
paying the back due amounts if the homeowner does not believe he is in default 
could be interpreted as giving legal advice.  Telling the homeowner to call the 
bank for more information seems equally inappropriate.  The ethical duties 
related to unrepresented parties illustrate the untenable schizophrenia that exists 
when an attorney for the bank is also charged with being the neutral trustee in a 
disputed matter. 
The formation of an attorney-client relationship between the borrower and the 
attorney-trustee poses similar challenges.  For example, if the debtor becomes 
the attorney-trustee’s client, the trustee runs the risk of breaching the duty of 
confidentiality if it shares information from the borrower with the bank.342  
Similarly, the attorney-trustee’s failure to provide advice to the borrower could 
constitute malpractice.  Finally, it is unclear whether the inclusion of an 
“attorney fee” or a “trustee fee” in the homeowner’s deficiency creates an 
attorney-client relationship between the borrower and the attorney-trustee. 
Interestingly, the most obvious conflict the attorney-trustee may have is with 
the bank.  The attorney is required to represent the bank “zealously” so long as 
it is “within the bounds of the law.”343  At the same time, the attorney-trustee is 
required by most states to be a neutral party between the bank and the borrower.  
If the attorney-trustee took this duty seriously, it would have to disclose this 
conflict to the bank.344  By disclosing that it could not advocate for the bank, or 
even accept the bank’s story as true if challenged by a homeowner, the attorney-
trustee would likely convince the bank it needed new counsel.  However, there 
is no evidence that any attorney-trustee has ever made such a disclosure to any 
bank. This speaks to the fact that most trustees either do not see the conflict or 
do not care that a conflict exists. 
These issues can be addressed without questioning the ethics of any specific 
attorney.  Rather, attorneys should pose ethical questions to and seek advisory 
opinions from their state bar associations and ethical boards in order to 
determine what an attorney-trustee may and may not do.  The attorney could 
ask: 
1. May a neutral attorney-trustee decide an issue in favor of its client 
and against a homeowner, to whom the attorney-trustee owes a 
fiduciary duty, if there is a dispute between the parties as to law or 
fact? 
2. May an attorney hold a duty of zealous advocacy for one party while 
simultaneously owing a duty of neutrality to a party whose interests 
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are adverse to the attorney’s client?  Would this require written 
disclosure to one or both parties? 
3. May a trustee for a homeowner in a foreclosure also appear in court 
to advocate against the homeowner and in favor of foreclosure? 
4. Does an attorney who serves as a trustee and has a legally 
recognized fiduciary duty to a borrower enter into an attorney-client 
relationship if the borrower shares information with the trustee or 
seeks advice from the trustee because the he believes that the trustee 
is an attorney and is required to be fair to the borrower? 
5. If an attorney agrees to serve as a trustee in a foreclosure, and, in 
the process of that foreclosure, obtains information from a borrower 
to whom the trustee owes a fiduciary duty, is the trustee prohibited 
from later using that information in a subsequent action against the 
borrower? 
6. If an attorney agrees to serve as a trustee in a foreclosure, and, in 
the process of that foreclosure, obtains information from a borrower 
to whom the trustee owes a fiduciary duty, is the trustee prohibited 
from later representing another party against the borrower in a related 
transaction? 
In addition to advisory opinions, attorneys who commit ethical violations 
could be reported to the state bar association or ethics committee.  Adverse 
opinions in this setting could deter future misconduct.  Similarly, if attorneys 
continue to engage in practices prohibited by advisory rulings, there would be 
little reason for them to escape punishment.  Overall, it is likely that some states 
would issue advisory opinions that would be inconsistent with some current 
practices, which could help to eradicate some of the questionable conduct of 
modern trustees. 
2.  A Real Example On Which to Build 
This proposal is more than theory.  The North Carolina State Bar has already 
considered the ethical duties of the attorney-trustee in a foreclosure action.  The 
Ethics Committee concluded that “[s]o long as the attorney serves as trustee, he 
may not be involved in any proceeding arising from or connected with the deed 
of trust.”345  More specifically, the Committee explained that 
 [t]he proper rule is that the trustee/attorney cannot ethically represent 
either the lender or the borrower in a role of advocacy at any state of 
the foreclosure proceeding. The trustee in his fiduciary capacity is 
charged with the duty of preserving the interests of both, and in that 
sense he represents both. If, during the existence of the fiduciary 
relationship, he should act in an adversary capacity for either, he 
                                                            
 345. N.C. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 82 (1990). 
154 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:103 
would violate his fiduciary duty to the owner, and this would offend 
the Code provision against conflict of interest.346 
The problem is that the Ethics Committee provided this guidance in 1978.347  
Consequently, there is a pressing need for an examination of the ethics of the 
dual role of the attorney and the trustee to be in the modern mortgage era.  Clear 
inquiries and precise answers would have an immediate impact on the behavior 
of trustees.  Although it is difficult to predict what ethics boards will say in 
response to questions about relatively new, sometimes poorly understood 
situations, it seems likely that, at a minimum, ethics decisions could serve as a 
check on the most egregious behaviors of some  
attorney-trustees. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Presently, the very banks that collapsed the world economy are being trusted, 
with no judicial oversight and no meaningful neutral party, to remove people 
from their homes.  The same companies responsible for robo-signing, 
derivatives, MERS, the bailout, and exotic loans that were designed to fail are 
trusted to carry out foreclosures fairly.  The banks’ actions go unchecked 
because trustees are unregulated and, in some cases, unfair.  There is no doubt 
that this system is broken, and that costs of wrongful foreclosures are immense.  
Fortunately, there are some simple solutions that can convert trustees from 
potential accomplices to wrongful foreclosures into meaningful parts of the 
solution.  Legislation, litigation, and ethical inquiries are all means to 
accomplish this goal.  Reforming the role of the trustee protects property rights, 
promotes certainty, reduces the number of wrongful foreclosures, and 
encourages modifications of loans.  These results are good for homeowners, but, 
more importantly, are net positives for the broader economy and society as a 
whole. 
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